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Prior to 2001, any ostensible controversy' over the interpretation of the
Second Amendment was largely confined to law review articles and horta-
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Linda Heisler, both of whom provided valuable feedback during the drafting process. I also
want to thank my parents, Fred and Charlene, and my siblings, Ron and Stephanie, for their
love, guidance, and support throughout this process. Finally, I want to thank the love of my
life, Amy, who has made numerous sacrifices over the past three years while I was in law
school. While I don't deserve her, I sure am glad someone thought that I did.
I Recent federal cases tend to underscore the embryonic nature of the academic contro-
versy surrounding the interpretation of the Second Amendment and the growing endorse-
ment of the "individual right" approach. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 938 n.2
(1997) (Thomas, J., concurring) (observing that a "growing body of scholarly commentary
indicates that the 'right to keep and bear arms' is, as the Amendment's text suggests, a per-
sonal right"); Nordyke v. King, 319 F.3d 1185, 1191 (9th Cir. 2003) (opining that the 'indi-
vidual rights view' . .. has enjoyed recent widespread academic endorsement"); Silveira v.
Lockeyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that the debate over the Second
Amendment "has gained intensity over the last several years"); United States v. Emerson,
270 F.3d 203, 220 (5th Cir. 2001) ("The individual rights view has enjoyed considerable
academic endorsement, especially in the last two decades."); see also OFFICE OF LEGAL
COUNSEL, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, WHETHER THE SECOND AMENDMENT SECURES AN INDIVIDUAL
RIGHT, available at www.usdoj.gov/olc/ secondamendment2.htm (2004) [hereinafter OLC
MEMORANDUM] (observing that "the burgeoning scholarly literature on the Second Amend-
ment in the past two decades has explored the meaning of the Second Amendment in great




tory pronouncements by public officials. The Second Amendment reads,
"A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.",2 In un-
derscoring the importance of its prefatory clause, which recognized the
primacy of the militias as the guarantors of state sovereignty, the Court ob-
served in 1939 that the "obvious purpose" 3 of the Second Amendment was
"to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of such
forces [the Militia]."4 The Court held that the Second Amendment "must
be interpreted and applied with that end in view.",5 Since its decision in
United States v. Miller, however, the Court has neither endorsed the appro-
priate interpretive approach nor expounded on the precise nature of the right
conferred under the Second Amendment .
Various scholars and jurists have proposed different interpretive ap-
proaches as lodestars for determining the constitutionality of federal fire-
arms statutes. The "collective right" approach posits that the right to keep
and bear arms under the Second Amendment protects the right of States to
organize and arm well-regulated militias.7 The "limited individual right"
2 U.S. CONST. amend. II. There is little redeeming value to the actual language of the
Second Amendment. It is difficult to support any interpretive approach of the Second
Amendment based solely on its text. See Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second
Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 643-44 (1989) (observing that "no one has ever described
the Constitution as a marvel of clarity, and the Second Amendment is perhaps one of the
worst drafted of all its provisions"). But see Emerson, 270 F.3d at 259 ("Given the political
dynamic of the day, the wording of the Second Amendment is exactly what would have been
expected. The Federalists had no qualms with recognizing the individual right of all Ameri-
cans to keep and bear arms."). Emerson, however, represented the first time a federal appel-
late court embraced the "individual right" interpretation of the Second Amendment. Had the
language of the Second Amendment been eminently understandable, it seems likely that at
least one federal court would have placed its imprimatur on the Fifth Circuit's sentiment
prior to Emerson, which was decided 210 years after the ratification of the Constitution.
3 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 177 (1939)
4 Id. The full sentence reads, "With obvious purpose to assure the continuation and ren-
der possible the effectiveness of such forces the declaration and guarantee of the Second
Amendment were made."
5id.
6 The Court has, however, indirectly addressed several issues surrounding the meaning
of the Second Amendment. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 938 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting
that "a growing body of scholarly commentary indicates that the 'right to keep and bear
arms' is, as the Amendment's text suggests, a personal right"); United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990) (observing that the phrase "the people" ought to be con-
strued in the same way throughout the Constitution and the Bill of Rights to encompass a
broad class of persons); Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980) (citing Miller for
the proposition that the Second Amendment does not guarantee a right to keep and bear arms
that does not have a reasonable relationship to the preservation and efficiency of a well-
regulated militia).
7 See, e.g., Silveira v. Lockeyer, 312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2003).
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(or "sophisticated collective right") approach embraces the proposition that
the right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment inures to in-
dividuals only to the extent that they actively participate as members of a
functional and well-regulated militia.8 The "individual right" approach ar-
gues that the right to keep and bear arms belongs to individuals, irrespective
of their active participation in a functional and well-regulated militia.9 Un-
til 2001, every federal appellate court presented with a Second Amendment
challenge embraced either the "collective right" approach' ° or the "sophisti-
cated collective right" approach. 1
Recent developments, however, have catapulted the individual right
approach to the forefront of the Second Amendment debate. First, on Oc-
tober 16, 2001, the Fifth Circuit issued its much anticipated decision in
United States v. Emerson,12 dismissing a Second Amendment challenge to a
federal statute that prohibited individuals under domestic protective orders
from owning or possessing firearms. In dicta, however, the Fifth Circuit
observed that the Second Amendment does indeed confer an individual
right to keep and bear arms, marking the first time a federal appellate court
endorsed the individual right approach.13
Shortly thereafter, Attorney General John Ashcroft, in a memorandum
to all U.S. Attorneys, opined that Emerson "generally reflect[s] the correct
understanding of the Second Amendment."' 14 In May. 2002, Ashcroft offi-
cially reversed the Department of Justice's (DOJ) longstanding policy con-
cerning the Second Amendment's meaning, announcing that the:
current position of the United States... is that the Second Amendment more broadly
protects the rights of individuals, including persons who are Qot members of any mili-
tia or engaged in active military service or training, to possess and bear their own fire-
arms, subject to reasonable restrictions designed to prevent... criminal misuse.15
8 See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265 (llth Cir. 1997).
9 See, e.g., United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).
10 See Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d
103 (6th Cir. 1976); Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 1999); Hickman
v. Block, 81 F.3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996).
11 See United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265 (1lth Cir. 1997); United States v. Rybar,
103 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1977); Cases v. United States, 121 F.2d 916 (1st
Cir. 1942).
12 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).
13 Id. The Second Circuit and the D.C. Circuit are the only circuits that have yet to take a
definitive position on the correct interpretive approach under the Second Amendment.
14 John Ashcroft, Memorandum to all United States' Attorneys (Nov. 9, 2001), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingrooni/emerson.htm.
15 Brief for the United States in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari at 21-22 n.3, Emer-
son v. United States (Feb. 28, 2002) (No. 01-8780).
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Jurisprudential developments in 2003 and 2004 have only intensified
the controversy surrounding the Second Amendment's meaning and its
prospect for incorporation against the states. On January 27, 2003, in up-
holding California's Assault Weapons Control Act against a Second
Amendment challenge, the Ninth Circuit explicitly disavowed Emerson, re-
affirming its interpretation of the Second Amendment as a "collective right"
to keep and bear arms. 16 Then, on February 16, 2003, the Ninth Circuit up-
held an Alameda County (California) ordinance prohibiting the possession
of firearms on its property; the ban effectively prohibited the sponsorship of
gun shows on the County's property.17 The court, however, upheld the or-
dinance solely on stare decisis grounds, noting that "if we were writing on a
blank slate, we may be inclined to follow the approach of the Fifth Circuit
in Emerson."'18 In a special concurrence, Judge Ronald Gould suggested
that a thorough examination of the Second Amendment's place in the
Court's modem incorporation doctrine was long overdue, observing that the
"maintenance of an armed citizenry might be argued to be implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty and protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."'19 On December 2, 2003, the Court denied certio-
rari in Silveira, refusing to reconsider the implications of its holding in
Miller.2°
Additionally, on two separate occasions in 2004, the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia upheld Washington, D.C.'s re-
strictive handgun ordinance against Second Amendment challenges by in-
dividuals who wished to possess firearms for personal protection.2' Finally,
on August 24, 2004, the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel
issued a memorandum endorsing the individual right approach, affirming
16 See Silveira v. Lockeyer, 312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2003); accord Hickman v. Block, 81
F.3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996).
17 See Nordyke v. King, 319 F. 3d 1185 (9th Cir. 2003).
18 Id. at 1191.
19 Id. at 1193 n.3 (Gould, J., concurring).
20 Silveira v. Lockeyer, 312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1046
(2003).
21 See Parker v. District of Columbia, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103 (D.D.C. 2004); Seegars v.
Ashcroft, 297 F. Supp. 2d 201 (D.D.C. 2004). Seegars was particularly unique in that the
district court addressed the issue of whether the Second Amendment applied to the District
of Columbia, which is neither under the complete authority of the federal government, nor
under the authority of a State or a political subdivision of a State. The judge in Seegars con-
cluded that the Second Amendment does not apply to the District of Columbia. The D.C.
Circuit affirmed the district court's holding in Seegars, but concluded that the litigants
lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute. See Seegars v. Gonzales,
396 F.3d 1248 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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then-General Ashcroft's sentiment concerning the nature of the guarantee
conferred by the Second Amendment.22
The nature of the right conferred by the Second Amendment is inextri-
cably intertwined with the issue of its incorporation against the states. 23 If
the right is either collective or limited to individuals engaged in active mili-
tia service on behalf of a state, the Second Amendment would become op-
erative at the state level only if the State itself sought to disarm its own mi-
litia (or, in the modem era, its particular branch of the National Guard). If
the Second Amendment, however, confers a broad individual right that be-
comes operative irrespective of whether an individual is an active partici-
pant in the state militia, the scope of the protection is indubitably broader,
implicating the State's actions to the extent that it infringes upon the indi-
vidual right.24
The constitutional muster of firearms regulations, both at the federal
and state level, could be imperiled if the Court placed its imprimatur on the
proposition that the Second Amendment confers a broad individual right.
In most instances where a constitutional right enjoys textual support, the
Court's endorsement of the right as uniquely individual is both a necessary
and sufficient condition for its incorporation. Unless the Court determined
that the right conferred by the Second Amendment is wholly distinguish-
able from other constitutional rights already incorporated against state ac-
22 See OLC MEMORANDUM, supra note 1.
23 See Jack Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 CHI.-
KENTL. REv. 103, 156 (2000):
Indeed, ending the exile of the Second Amendment to the district of unincorporated rights is as
much the object of the individual right interpretation as insisting upon a particular account of the
original understanding of 1787-1791. It would do no good to demonstrate conclusively that the
framers and ratifiers of those years really did regard a fundamental right to own weapons as a
necessary security against the danger of tyranny, if one could not at the same time produce a
compelling rationale for its incorporation today.
24 Indeed, the District Court in Emerson implied as much when, in summarizing the
views of various adherents to the individual right approach, it opined that the Second
Amendment "protects an individual right inherent in the concept of ordered liberty." United
States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 600 (N.D. Tex. 1999). The conclusion reached by
the Emerson court at the trial level was cloaked in the language employed by the Court in
cases where various constitutional rights have been incorporated against the States. See, e.g.,
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (noting that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause protects liberties that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty not jus-
tice would exist if they were sacrificed") (internal quotations and citations omitted); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (observing that those constitutional provisions that
have been incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause are "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty").
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* 25. dfiuttation, it is difficult to envision a scenario where the Court would hold that
the Second Amendment's guarantee is individual, but that its scope is con-
fined to proscribe only laws and regulations enacted under the auspices of
federal power. If the Second Amendment's protection is indeed individual,
some individual right adherents contend, firearms regulations enacted by
states and their political subdivisions ought to be subject to strict scrutiny
26
in light of the fundamental nature of the right that would be implicated. In-
corporation is a historical corollary to constitutional rights that are con-
strued as affording individual protections.27
Incorporation, however, would fundamentally alter and irreparably
damage the delicate balance sought by the Framers of the Second Amend-
ment, who viewed the Second Amendment not as a sweeping individual
right to be retained by the general populace, but as a buttress against federal
encroachment into the states' provincial authority over the governance and
armament of their respective militias. Moreover, the Second Amendment is
different from other constitutional rights incorporated against state action.
Even assuming that the Second Amendment does indeed confer an individ-
ual right, it would not necessarily follow that the right itself is presump-
tively fun4amental to the American scheme of justice, such that it ought to
be incorporated against individual states.
In the aftermath of the Emerson decision and the Ashcroft memoran-
dum to U.S. Attorneys, many criminal defendants and convicted felons
have sought refuge under the relatively novel proposition that the Second
25 See Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971) (prohibition against excessive bail under the
Eighth Amendment); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy provision
under the Fifth Amendment); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (jury trial under the
Sixth Amendment); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (right to a speedy and
public trial under the Sixth Amendment); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (com-
pulsory process for securing witness testimony under the Sixth Amendment); Malloy v. Ho-
gan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (freedom of speech and press under
the First Amendment); Abingdon Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Establish-
ment Clause under the First Amendment); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right
to counsel under the Sixth Amendment); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment); Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S.
196 (1948) (right to notice of charges); Chicago B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226
(1897) (taking of property without just compensation under the Fifth Amendment).
26 See Janice Baker, Comment, The Next Step in Second Amendment Analysis: Incorpo-
rating the Right to Bear Arms into the Fourteenth Amendment, 28 U. DAYTON L. REv. 35, 55
(2002) (observing that strict scrutiny "logically follows.., if the Supreme Court considers a
right fundamental to the American scheme of justice").
27 Id.
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Amendment confers an individual right.28 That many of these Second
Amendment challenges are increasingly being lodged at the state level
against state law is a testament to the belief, however misguided, that in-
corporation necessarily follows from the existence of an individual right. In
construing the Second Amendment as an individual right, Emerson has pro-
vided legal ammunition for criminal defendants seeking to overturn their
convictions. As a practical matter, the Fifth Circuit's dicta in Emerson, if
widely embraced, could pave the way for shifting the burden in Second
Amendment cases, requiring the government to demonstrate a compelling
governmental interest in a statute regulating firearms. In many ways, then,
definitively resolving the nature of the right conferred by the Second
Amendment is merely a dress rehearsal for proponents who champion the
argument that the Second Amendment ought to be incorporated against the
states. If the Court determined that the essence of the right under the Sec-
ond Ariendment is individual rather than collective, individual right adher-
ents believe incorporation would not lurk far behind.
Part II of this comment identifies and examines the chief interpretive
approaches under the Second Amendment, the collective right approach and
the individual right approach. I ultimately conclude that the collective right
approach is more congruent with the Second Amendment's text, structure,
and history than the individual right approach. Part III analyzes the Court's
Second Amendment jurisprudence and its interpretation by the circuit
courts. That no federal appellate court has ever overturned a federal gun
control law on Second Amendment grounds suggests that the Court's few
decisions interpreting the Second Amendment reject the proposition that the
right is individual in nature. Part III also highlights the controversy sur-
rounding the viability of the Court's dated-but nevertheless viable-
pronouncements on the concomitant debate concerning incorporation of the
Second Amendment.
Part IV details the genesis and development of the Court's modern in-
corporation doctrine, underscoring its endorsement of the selective incorpo-
ration approach and its factor-based analysis in Duncan v. Louisiana29 to
determine whether a particular constitutional right is fundamental to the
American scheme of justice. Part V contends that the Second Amendment
is not fundamental to the American scheme of justice under the Court's
modern incorporation doctrine, articulated in Duncan. Employing the fac-
28 These challenges, based on Emerson and the Ashcroft memorandum, have been uni-
formly rejected. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 328 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2003); Olympic
Arms v. Buckles, 301 F.3d 384 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Hinostroza, 297 F.3d 924
(9th Cir. 2002).
29 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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tors enumerated in Duncan, which embrace both originalism and majori-
tarianism as appropriate modes of constitutional analysis, I conclude that
even were the Court to reconsider its Second Amendment incorporation de-
cisions predating Duncan, the standards emanating from its incorporation
jurisprudence support the conclusion that the Second Amendment should
not be incorporated against state action.
Part VI concludes by juxtaposing the individual right approach with
the potential incorporation of the Second Amendment. While the overarch-
ing interpretive approaches under the Second Amendment continue to be
the subject of substantial academic and judicial controversy, the endorse-
ment of the individual right approach should neither be confused nor
equated with answering the separate and distinct question of whether a right
is fundamental to the American scheme of justice. If the Second Amend-
ment does indeed confer a broader individual right, it is difficult to recon-
cile the thousands of firearms regulations that gun control opponents often
allude to, duly enacted by representatives of "the people," with the notion
that such a right is fundamental to the American scheme of justice. Indeed,
if the Second Amendment does confer an individual right, it remains likely
that many firearms regulations would continue to withstand constitutional
scrutiny precisely because the right conferred is not fundamental to the
American scheme of justice.
II. THE INTERPRETIVE APPROACHES UNDER THE SECOND AMENDMENT
A. THE COLLECTIVE RIGHT APPROACH30
Adherents of the collective right approach contend that the Second
Amendment's text, structure, and history render the Amendment's protec-
tion collective in nature, guaranteeing to states the right to organize and
maintain militias to ensure the security of the State and deter potential en-
croachment by the federal government.31
301 include those embracing the "sophisticated collective right" approach (or the "limited
individual right" approach) under the rubric of the "collective right" approach. While the
"sophisticated collective right" approach is focused upon the individual rather than the State,
the interpretive approach is essentially the same since the ultimate determination hinges
upon the regulation's effect on the preservation and efficiency of the militia.
31 See, e.g., Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 309 (1998); Michael Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment Mean Today?, 76
Cm.-KENT L. REV. 291 (2000); Keith A. Ehrman & Denis A. Henigan, The Second Amend-
ment in the Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV.
5 (1989); Paul Finkelman, "A Well Regulated Militia ": The Second Amendment in Histori-
cal Perspective, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 195 (2000); Jack Rakove, The Second Amendment:
The Highest Stage of Orginalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 103 (2000); David Yassky, The
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First, the text of the Second Amendment is readily distinguishable
from other Amendments ensconced in the Bill of Rights because it contains
a prefatory clause,32 which provides the context in which the right to keep
and bear arms becomes constitutionally protected.33 The prefatory clause
establishes the parameters for interpreting the operative right of the people
to keep and bear arms, which belongs to the militias of the several states.34
Collective right adherents assert that the militia is a state military force, and
thus the right under the Second Amendment inures not to its constituent
members, but rather to the "Militia" as a collective entity, for the purpose of
ensuring the "the Security of a Free State."35 That "the Security of a Free
State" is to be achieved by the formation of a "well-regulated Militia" sug-
gests that the "right of the people to keep and bear arms" only exists where
it effectuates that purpose.36
While the operative clause of the Second Amendment is not without
ambiguity, its phraseology suggests a military context in which the "right of
the people to keep and bear arms" exists. One of the interpretive difficulties
associated with the second clause in the Second Amendment is whether to
construe "keep and bear arms" as a "unitary phrase, 37 or as separate and
distinct phrases unto themselves ("keep arms" and "bear arms"), each with
its own substantive import. The collective right approach posits that the
phrase "keep and bear arms" is indeed unitary, and that the use of the word
"bear" "has a primarily military connotation."38 The purpose for keeping
Second Amendment: Structure, History, and Consitutional Change, 99 MICH. L. REV. 588
(2000).
32 The Fifth Circuit referred to the Second Amendment's prefatory clause as a "pream-
ble," which presupposes the conclusion it seeks to prove. Calling the prefatory clause a
"preamble" necessarily restricts its constructive breadth. The term is a misnomer to the ex-
tent that it suggests the "preamble" is but a preface to the Amendment itself. See United
States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 233 (5th Cir. 2001) (conceding only that the "the preamble
implies that the substantive guarantee is one which tends to enable, promote or further the
existence, continuation or effectiveness of that 'well-regulated Militia' which is 'necessary
to the security of a free State"').
33 Silveira v. Lockeyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1068-69 (2003) ("The first or prefatory clause of
the Second Amendment sets forth the amendment's purpose and intent.").
34 See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 177-78 (1939).
35 Yassky, supra note 31, at 605-07.
36 Finkelman, supra note 31, at 230-31.
37 Doff, supra note 31, at 317.
38 Yassky, supra note 31, at 619; see also Lucilius A Emery, The Constitutional Right to
Keep and Bear Arms, 28 HARV. L. REv. 473, 476 (1915) (contending that a "single individ-
ual or the unorganized crowd, in carrying weapons, is not spoken of or thought of as 'bearing
arms'). Earlier decisions by State Supreme Courts support the notion that "bear arms" has a
unique military connotation. See Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154 (1840); English v. State, 35
Tex. 473, 476 (1872); State v. Workman, 35 W. Va. 367 (1891).
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arms under the Second Amendment is so that they may by borne by the
people in the militia when necessary to preserve the security of the state.39
Second, the Amendment itself advances the Constitution's structural
solidification of the militia as a state-controlled entity that complements na-
tional military power and buttresses the state against potential encroach-
ment by the federal government.40  The Second Amendment reflects "the
delicately balanced military structure envisioned by the Founders-an army
constitutionally available, but obviated by a well-prepared, state-based mili-
tia. 4 1 Throughout the drafting and revising of the Constitution, the Anti-
Federalists remained deeply troubled by federal hegemony in the military
arena, borne by a historical "fear of standing armies., 42 Of particular con-
cern to the Anti-Federalists was Article I, Section 8, which transferred au-
thority over the state militias to the federal government.43 Collective right
adherents construe the Second Amendment as "an affirmation that only cer-
tain, specifically described powers had been granted to the federal govern-
ment, and that residual power remained with the states.,
44
The interpretation of the phrase "the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms" thus should not be "divorced from its context among the Con-
stitution's other military provisions. 45 Collective right adherents dispute
the proposition, embraced by individual right adherents, that "the people" in
the Second Amendment are the same people referred to throughout the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, a notion that would substantially
broaden the scope of the right.46 The practical consequence flowing from
39 Silveira v. Lockeyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2003).
40 Yassky, supra note 31, at 599.
41 Id. at 610.
42 Id. at 608.
43 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 ("To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the
Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions."); U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl.
16:
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of
them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respec-
tively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the
discipline prescribed by Congress.
44 Yassky, supra note 31, at 609.
451 d. at 650.
46 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990) (noting that its ob-
servation was not "conclusive," the Court stated that "'the people' protected by the First and
Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments, refers to a class of people who are part of a national community or who have
otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that
community"). But see Perpich v. Dep't of Defense, 496 U.S. 334 (1990) (identifying the
composition of the militia in accordance with Congressional statute, which would exclude a
broad class of persons).
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this proposition is that the right to keep and bear arms protects the same
"people" under the same terms as (for example) the First Amendment. Col-
lective right adherents contend that construing the term "militia" in a simi-
lar fashion, however, conflicts with the notion that the "people" in the Sec-
ond Amendment are the same "people" that exist throughout the
Constitution-namely the unorganized mass of the entire citizenry. If the
"militia" in the Second Amendment is the same "militia" in Article I, Sec-
tion 8, the inevitable conclusion flowing from such a premise is that the mi-
litia does not include the unorganized mass of the citizens of the United
States. The Constitution authorizes Congress to modify membership in the
militia by statute through its responsibility to organize the militia, clarifying
that the "people" in the militia are not the unorganized mass of the entire
citizenry, but rather a statutorily defined group that is subject to modifica-
tion by Congress.47
The Constitution expressly delegates to Congress the authority for or-
ganizing the militia,48 enabling it to define membership eligibility and
promulgate exclusions and exemptions from militia service. Under the Na-
tional Guard statute, Congress' modem militia statute, "a person must be at
least 17 years of age and under 45, or under 64 years of age and a former
member of the Regular Army, Regular Navy, Regular Air Force, or Regular
Marine Corps., 49 If a well-regulated militia only includes those individuals
that Congress, pursuant to its constitutional power, chooses to include, "the
people" in the Second Amendment only encompass those citizens who are
both eligible for and participate in militia service. 50 In Perpich v. Depart-
ment of Defense, the Court adopted the definition of the militia prescribed
by Congressional statute, a determination that is of significant consequence
to the fate of the "individual right" approach. 51 As Professor Michael Dorf
notes,
That statutory definition expressly excludes women who are not members of the Na-
tional Guard and men who are not able-bodied and (unless they are former members
of the regular armed forces who enlisted in the National Guard before they turned
sixty-four) under forty-four years of age. Thus, the individual rights scholars' theory
47 U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 16.
48 Id.
49 32 U.S.C. § 313 (a) (1999); see also 10 U.S.C. § 311 (a) (1999):
The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age and...
under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a declaration of intention to become, citizens
of the United States, and of female citizens of the United States who are members of the National
Guard.
50 Yassky, supra note 31, at 622-24; Dorf, supra note 31, at 305-06.
51 Perpich v. Dep't of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 351-54 (1990).
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would deny a right to own or possess firearms to the disabled, to most women, to most
middle-aged men, and to all older Americans. ,,
52
Third, collective right adherents contend that the history underlying
adoption reflects the Framers' intention that the Second Amendment be re-
stricted to a narrow, specific subject in a narrow, specific context.53 Collec-
tive right adherents argue that both James Madison's original draft of the
Second Amendment and its subsequent modifications reflect the general
tension between the competing visions of federal and state power broached
by the Federalists and Anti-Federalists during the Constitutional Conven-
tion and its aftermath. 54 Madison's original draft of the Second Amend-
ment provided the following: "The right of the people to keep and bear
arms shall not be infringed; a well armed, and well regulated militia being
the best security of a free country; but no person religiously scrupulous of
bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service in person. ,
55
The battle over the phraseology of Madison's Amendment focused al-
most exclusively on the capacity of the federal government to exempt indi-
viduals who were "religiously scrupulous" from "bearing arms. 56 Indeed,
Elbridge Gerry, a leading Anti-Federalist, perceived this clause as a poten-
tial hegemonic source for the federal government should it wish to proclaim
itself as the ultimate arbiter of criteria for participation in the militia, a
power that Anti-Federalists sought to ascribe to the states. 7
The Second Amendment adopted by Congress and ratified by the
States thus reflected a compromise that implicitly acknowledged the impor-
52 Dorf, supra note 31, at 305-06 (emphasis added). Individual right adherents dispute
the contention that the substantive right to keep and bear arms is either contextual to militia
service or restricted to individuals eligible for militia service.
53 See, e.g., Silveira v. Lockeyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1076-85 (9th Cir. 2003). The history
underlying the adoption of the Second Amendment is particularly important in the context of
incorporation, where originalism has become the preeminent mode of constitutional interpre-
tation. Some collective right adherents, however, eschew originalism as either the primary
or a significant mode of constitutional interpretation. See Doff, supra note 31, at 92-93
("Original understanding is not the sole, nor even the principal, measure of a constitutional
interpretation's correctness."); Rakove, supra note 31, at 108 ("It is far from a self-evident
truth that originalism is the sole authoritative mode of constitutional interpretation, nor do
many who dabble in originalist analyses always reflect on the logic of what they are do-
ing."). I believe that the original meaning of the Second Amendment is central to the incor-
poration analysis; this is discussed in greater detail in Section V.
54 See Yassky, supra note 31, at 608-10.
55 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 169
(Neil Cogan ed., Oxford University Press 1997) [hereinafter "THE COMPLETE BILL OF
RIGHTS"].
56 Yassky, supra note 31, at 609-10.
57 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 55, at 186-88.
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tance of state militias as a hegemonic check against the federal army. 58
Conspicuously absent from the debate over the meaning of the Second
Amendment in the First Congress, collective right adherents note, is any
significant exchange concerning the scope of the right beyond its applica-
tion to the states' militias.5 9 As the Ninth Circuit observed in Silveira,
"there is not a single statement in the congressional debate about the pro-
posed amendment that indicates that any congressman contemplated that it
would establish an individual right to possess a weapon.,
60
B. THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHT APPROACH
Individual right adherents largely approach the interpretation of the
Second Amendment in the same fashion as collective right adherents, but
reach a far different conclusion about its substantive import. Individual
right adherents maintain that the text, structure, and history of the Second
Amendment support a broader meaning that encompasses the right of indi-
viduals to keep and bear arms, irrespective of whether those individuals par-
ticipate in an active, well-regulated militia.61
First, individual right adherents contend that the text and structure of
the Second Amendment, notwithstanding its prefatory clause, inevitably
lead to the conclusion that it is "the people" who enjoy the right to keep and
bear arms.62 While the Second Amendment's prefatory clause is anomalous
when compared with other Amendments to the Constitution, Professor
Eugene Volokh argues that such purpose clauses were "commonplace" 63 in
contemporaneous state constitutions. The existence of the prefatory clause
in the Second Amendment, Volokh argues, ought to be accorded a modi-
cum of constructive significance, but should not be construed as "something
deeply portentous. 64 Volokh asseverates that "the justification clause may
aid construction of the operative clause but may not trump the meaning of
the operative clause: To the extent the operative clause is ambiguous, the
58 Yassky, supra note 31, at 610.
59 Silveira v. Lockeyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1085 (9th Cir. 2003).60 Id.
61 See Stephen Halbrook, The Right of the People or the Power of the State: Bearing
Arms, Arming Militias, and the Second Amendment, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 131 (1991); Levin-
son, supra note 2; Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to
Self-Preservation, 39 ALA L. REV. 103 (1987); William Van Alstyne, The Second Amend-
ment and the Personal Right to Bear Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236 (1994); Eugene Volokh, The
Commonplace SecondAmendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793 (1998).
62 See generally supra note 61.
63 See Volokh, supra note 61, at 793.
64 1d. at 797.
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justification clause may inform our interpretation of it, but the justification
clause can't take away what the operative clause provides. 65
Volokh's textual exegesis is ultimately unpersuasive. It is not entirely
clear what significance, if any, Volokh attributes to the existence of the
Second Amendment's prefatory clause.66 The better extrapolation from Vo-
lokh's research is that the prefatory clause of the Second Amendment ought
to be accorded greater weight, precisely because it was so unique to the
lexicon of the federal Constitution.
Individual right adherents argue that the terms "the people" and the
"Militia" are synonymous terms in the Second Amendment encompassing
"the ordinary citizenry." 67 Furthermore, the structure of the Constitution,
and particularly the Bill of Rights, suggests that "the people" in the Second
Amendment are the same "people" in other constitutional provisions that
protect individual rights, including the First Amendment and the Fourth
Amendment.68  The term "the people" in the Second Amendment thus
"clearly protects individuals', not states', rights. ' 69  That the term "bear
arms" suggests a military usage is not dispositive of the circumstances un-
der which the right may be enjoyed, individual right adherents argue, since
65 Id. at 807.
66 See also OLC MEMORANDUM, supra note 1 ("Similarly, the Supreme Court has held
that the Constitution's preamble lacks any operative legal effect and that, even though it
states the Constitution's 'general purposes,' it cannot be used to conjure a 'spirit' of the
document to confound clear operative language."). Why actual language in the Second
Amendment ought to be accorded no more constructive breadth than language in the pream-
ble to the Constitution is baffling. The logical conclusion emanating from this observation is
that the first part of the Second Amendment "lacks any operative legal effect." To the extent
that the OLC Memorandum is reading the first clause of the Second Amendment into some
constitutional netherworld, its conclusion concerning the nature of the right secured by the
Second Amendment is deeply flawed.67 See Van Alstyne, supra note 61, at 1242. There is some disagreement among individ-
ual right adherents regarding the precise scope of the militia. The disagreement is important
because if the militia encompasses less than the entire citizenry, it is not synonymous with
"the people" under the Second Amendment. See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203,
226 (5th Cir. 2001) (The Militia "referred to the generality of the civilian male inhabitants
throughout their lives from teenage years until old age and to their personally keeping their
own arms, and not merely to individuals during the time (if any) they might be actively en-
gaged in actual military service or only to those who were members of special or select
units."); Lund, supra note 61, at 106 (noting that the Eighteenth Century definition of the
militia "included all citizens who qualified for military service (i.e., most adult males)." ). If
"the people" and the "Militia" are intratextually synonymous terms, the definition of the mi-
litia adopted by Lund and the Fifth Circuit suggests that the range of "the people" who can
exercise the right to keep and bear arms would exclude large segments of the population,
including women, the aged, and the infirmed.
68 See Emerson, 270 F.3d at 227-29.
69 Lund, supra note 61, at 107.
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it is "the people" who retain the right under the Second Amendment.7 °
Moreover, the private possession of firearms facilitates "familiar[ity] with
the principal instruments of military combat," 71 which ensures that the indi-
viduals who bear arms are in a position to be prepared to use them effec-
tively should circumstances warrant their use in a military conflict.72
Second, individual right adherents argue that the history of the Second
Amendment demonstrates that the right inures to the individual and not to
the militia as a collective entity. As Professor Sanford Levinson asserts, the
Second Amendment has an inextricable "linkage to conceptions of republi-
can political order,, 73 which finds its genesis in English conceptions of lib-
erty.74 Federalist 46 is often cited by individual right adherents for the
proposition that the Second Amendment confers an individual right because
James Madison underscored "the advantage of being armed, which the
Americans possess over the people of almost every other nation."75 Indi-
vidual right adherents contend that Madison did not envision the "advan-
tage of being armed" as conditionally effective upon one's participation in
the militia, but rather as a right enjoyed among the general populace.76
Individual right adherents also believe that the debates concerning the
adoption of the Second Amendment support an individual right. While the
Constitution was ratified by the states, most states submitted additional
amendments with their ratification documents, which sought to fortify the
70 Levinson, supra note 2, at 646-47.
71 Lund, supra note 61, at 107.
72Id. Lund takes this proposition one step further, suggesting that the term "well-
regulated" only requires that the militia "be regulated in some way." Lund argues that the
widespread right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment could regulate the mi-
litia by ensuring that the individuals who comprise it at least have the opportunity to become
trained in the use of firearms. Id.; see also Emerson, 270 F.3d at 259 (similarly arguing that
"the right of individual Americans to keep, carry, and acquaint themselves with firearms
does indeed promote a well-regulated militia by fostering the development of a pool of fire-
arms-familiar citizens that could be called upon to serve in the militia"). Both of these
analyses torture the definition of "well-regulated" to the point of meaninglessness. This in-
terpretation might carry weight if there were a requirement that potential members of the mi-
litia (and that would encompass all eligible individuals) keep and bear arms as private citi-
zens. There is no historical evidence to demonstrate that such a requirement ever existed,
and indeed, no such requirement exists today.
73 Levinson, supra note 2, at 650.
74 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 129, * 141, * 144. Blackstone distin-
guished between primary and auxiliary rights. The former referred to natural rights belong-
ing to each individual (such as personal liberty and personal security) while the latter re-
ferred to rights that enabled the viability of these natural rights (such as "the right of having
and using arms for self-preservation and defence").
75 THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison).
76 Van Alstyne, supra note 61, at 1244-45.
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Constitution with additional protections predicated on personal liberty.77
Individual right supporters argue that the machinations and modifications of
Madison's original Second Amendment proposal reflect efforts to protect
its individual rather than collective character.78 The ratification of the lan-
guage that is currently the Second Amendment therefore "protects individ-
ual Americans in their right to keep and bear arms whether or not they are a
member of a select militia or performing active military service or train-
ing."
79
III. THE COURT'S SECOND AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INCORPORATION CONUNDRUM
A. 19TH CENTURY DECISIONS ON THE SCOPE OF THE SECOND
AMENDMENT
Prior to the development of its modem incorporation doctrine80 in
Palko v. Connecticut8 and Duncan v. Louisiana,82 but subsequent to the en-
actment of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court was confronted with the
question of whether the Second Amendment was applicable against state
83 8action. In United States v. Cruikshank,84 two defendants were indicted for
conspiring to violate the constitutional rights of African-Americans, includ-
ing the right to peaceably assemble, the right to bear arms, and the right to
vote in state elections. In holding that the indictment against the defendants
was defective under the Enforcement Act of 1870 because it failed to prop-
erly aver violations of federal law committed by a federal entity, the Court
observed that the Second Amendment "is one of the amendments that has
no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national government.,
85
In rejecting a Second Amendment challenge just eleven years later, in
Presser v. Illinois, the Court reaffirmed the principle that the Second
Amendment is a "limitation only upon the power of Congress and the na-
77 Emerson, 270 F.3d at 241-44.
78 This will be discussed more fully in Section IV.
79 Emerson, 270 F.3d at 260.
80 This will be discussed more fully in Section IV.
81 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
82 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
83 See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542
(1875). The primary issue in Cruikshank was the interpretation of the Enforcement Act, an
1870 federal statute passed to enforce the rights of the citizens of the United States. The
primary issue in Presser was the legality, under Illinois law, of individuals forming private
militias in their capacity as private citizens unaffiliated with the State militia.
84 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
85 Id. at 553.
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tional government, and not upon that of the States. 86 The Court observed
in Presser that Illinois' Military Code, which prohibited the formation and
activation of a military entity not authorized by the Governor of Illinois, did
not implicate the strictures of the Second Amendment where the practical
impact of the Code was to preclude citizens in their private capacities from
carrying firearms. 87 Cruikshank and Presser received further solidification
in Miller v. Texas,88 where the Court, in upholding a state firearms law
against a Second Amendment challenge, opined that "it is well settled that
the restrictions of these amendments operate only upon the Federal power,
and have no reference whatever to proceedings in state courts.
89
It is important to note that none of the Court's nineteenth century Sec-
ond Amendment decisions purported to endorse a specific interpretive ap-
proach. Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller simply reflected the proposition
that the Second Amendment posed no barrier to State regulation of firearms
or firearms-related activity since the Amendment only restricted the powers
of the federal government, and not those of the several States. Moreover,
incorporation proponents argue, the authoritative power of Cruikshank,
Presser, and Miller is dubious in light of the development of the Court's
modem incorporation doctrine, which has applied many of the protections
in the Bill of Rights against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause.90
B. MILLER AND ITS APPLICATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
The Court's first (and indeed last) definitive ruling on the scope of the
Second Amendment occurred in 1939, where it upheld the National Fire-
arms Act against a challenge from two individuals who were indicted for
possessing sawed-off shotguns.9' In United States v. Miller, the Court held
that
86 116 U.S. at 265.
87 Id. at 264-65.
88 153 U.S. 535, 535 (1894).
891d. at 538.
90 See Levinson, supra note 2, at 653 (Levinson legitimately asks, "Why... should
Cruikshank and Presser be regarded as binding precedent any more than any of the other
'pre-incorporation' decisions refusing to apply given aspects of the Bill of Rights against the
states?"). Many proponents of incorporating the Second Amendment against the States,
however, accord these decisions almost no precedential weight, in light of their status as
dicta. See, e.g., Lund, supra note 61, at 110 ("Now that the doctrine of incorporation is so
unquestioningly applied to other provisions of the Bill of Rights, this deference to nineteenth
century precedent should be abandoned, and the Supreme Court should correct or justify a
patent inconsistency in the case law.").
91 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
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[i]n the absence of any evidence tending to show that the possession or use of a 'shot-
gun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length' at this time has some rea-
sonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we
cannot say that the Secohd Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an
instrument.... With obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render the possi-
ble the effectiveness of such forces the declaration and guarantee of the Second
Amendment were made.
92
Collective right adherents contend that Miller reflects the Court's con-
viction that the Second Amendment is only offended where federal firearms
regulations adversely affect the preservation or efficiency of well-regulated,
state militias.93 Individual right adherents, however, construe Miller for the
narrow proposition that because the possession of a sawed-off shotgun itself
did not bear a relationship to the preservation or efficiency of the militia,
regulating the possession of that particular firearm (and that firearm alone)
did not violate the Second Amendment. 94 Moreover, individual right ad-
herents contend that the Court's assertion that "the Militia comprised all
males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense...
enrolled for military discipline" 95 is a clear testament of the Court's belief
that the Second Amendment applied to all individuals capable of military
service, thus encompassing the entire populace of the United States.96 Since
92 1d. at 178.
93 See Dorf, supra note 31, at 298 (arguing that "the Supreme Court has come to under-
stand Miller as standing roughly for the collective right view of the Second Amendment");
Yassky, supra note 31, at 663 (noting that "at the very least, it is clear that the Miller Court
avoided giving the Second Amendment a broad construction similar to that of the First").
94 See Lund, supra note 61, at 109 ("Miller can be read as standing primarily for the
proposition that it is not within judicial notice that a sawed-off shotgun is any part of the or-
dinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense.") (internal
quotations and citations omitted); OLC MEMORANDUM, supra note 1 ("The nature of the
weapon at issue, not of the defendants or their activities, appeared to be the key fact, and this
aspect of the opinion tends to point toward the individual-right view rather than the quasi-
collective-right view.").
That Miller could be construed for such a narrow proposition strains credulity. The.Na-
tional Firearms Act also prohibited the carriage by private citizens of machine guns, which
have been and continue to be employed in military conflicts. While the Miller Court was not
confronted with the question of whether federal regulation of machine guns violates the Sec-
ond Amendment, the clear implication of the individual right interpretation of Miller is that
the regulatory regime under the National Firearms Act is unconstitutional to the extent that it
regulates firearms capable of usage in a military context. The logic of this narrow interpreta-
tion of Miller inexorably leads to the conclusion that regulating the private possession of as-
sault rifles, bazookas, grenades, shoulder-fired missiles, and rocket launchers, all of which
are commonly employed military implements, is unconstitutional as well.
95 Miller, 307 U.S. at 179.
96 See Levinson, supra note 2, at 646-47 (1989) ("There is strong evidence that 'militia'
refers to all of the people, or at least all of those treated as full citizens of the community.").
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Miller, the Court has not directly addressed the Second Amendment, re-
peatedly declining the invitation to clarify its holding.97
The development of Second Amendment jurisprudence has largely oc-
curred at the federal appellate level, where courts have overwhelmingly en-
dorsed the collective right approach or the sophisticated collective right ap-
proach, upholding federal gun regulations against Second Amendment
challenges. 98 Indeed, as Professor David Yassky notes, the district court's
decision in Emerson "was only the second in the nation's history in which a
federal court used the Amendment to invalidate a gun control law (the first
was the District Court decision in Miller which the Supreme Court subse-
quently reversed in 1939). " 99 While the Fifth Circuit, in dicta, embraced the
individual right approach in Emerson, the court nevertheless held that the
federal gun control law prohibiting individuals under domestic protective
orders'00 from possessing firearms was not an unconstitutional infringement
of the right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment. 101 Such a
restriction, the court concluded, was a reasonable, narrowly tailored excep-
tion that did not infringe on the Second Amendment rights of citizens.1
0 2
Indeed, no federal appellate court has ever invalidated a federal gun
control law on the basis that it infringed the right protected by the Second
Amendment. 10 3 Federal firearm laws largely consist of restrictions on indi-
viduals, and the individual right approach enjoys little support in the federal
courts. Rather, opponents of Miller and its progeny have little recourse but
97 See, e.g., Silveira v. Lockeyer, 312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
1046 (2003); Hale v. United States, 978 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S.
997 (1993); Farmer v. Higgins, 907 F.2d 1041 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1047
(1991); Quillici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 863 (1983); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 926 (1978); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 948 (1976); Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1010 (1972).
98 See supra notes 10-11 for federal appellate decisions embracing the collective right
approach or the sophisticated collective right approach.
99 Yassky, supra note 31, at 592.
100 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2004).
101 270 F.3d 203, 261 (5th Cir. 2001).
102 Id.
103 In recent years, however, the Court has invalidated parts of two federal gun control
laws on separate grounds. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that a
federal statute prohibiting gun possession within 1,000 feet of a school lacked a sufficient
nexus to interstate commerce to fall within the purview of Congress' power under the Com-
merce Clause); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that a requirement that
state law enforcement officers participate in the enforcement of federal law requiring back-
ground checks on gun purchases unconstitutionally commandeered the administrative appa-
ratus of the State to render federal service).
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to argue that the federal courts have entirely misperceived the nature of the
right conferred by the Second Amendment. As a matter of practicality,
however, such an argument is difficult to reconcile with the principle of
stare decisis; embracing the individual right approach logically requires ei-
ther a reevaluation of the Second Amendment by the federal courts or a
wholesale condemnation of Second Amendment jurisprudence developed in
the circuits.
IV. THE COURT'S MODERN INCORPORATION DOCTRINE
The addendum of a Bill of Rights reflected a profound and enduring
belief among Anti-Federalists that the Constitution itself failed to provide
sufficient checks on federal power.10 4 While Federalists were never particu-
larly enamored with the idea of a Bill of Rights, neither were they opposed
to such a concept in principle, provided that it not disrupt the essential gov-
ernmental structure ensconced in the Constitution. Lingering skepticism
concerning federal hegemony under the Constitution helped precipitate the
campaign for a Bill of Rights, which sought to constrain the powers of the
national government in various ways.10 5 Historical events following the
adoption of the Constitution, however, fundamentally altered the nature of
federal-state relations, effectuating a broad reexamination of the military's
structure in light of the United States' historical experience. 0 6 The changes
wrought by the Civil War culminated with the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which established the framework by which the Court would
reconsider its previous reluctance to incorporate the Bill of Rights against
the states.'
0 7
A. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
104 Yassky, supra note 31, at 607.
105 Rakove, supra note 31, at 126-27.
106 Yassky, supra note 31, at 639. Yassky observes that in the aftermath of the Civil
War, it is "unthinkable that those who framed and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment ex-
pected the military balance of power between the states and the federal government to revert
to the status quo ante bellum."
107 See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250 (1883) (establishing the rule, prior to adop-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, that the Bill of Rights "is intended solely as a limitation
on the exercise of power by the government of the United States, and is not applicable to the
legislation of the states").
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property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.'08
The first sentence in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment effec-
tively overruled Dred Scott v. Sandford,'0 9 where the Court infamously held
that black individuals could not become citizens under the meaning of the
Constitution because their "ancestors were imported into this country, and
sold as slaves." 110 The second sentence in Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, while more difficult to ascertain, generally evinces "an intent
to protect the freed blacks, as well as others, from abuses of state power."' 11
For the purposes of incorporation, the ultimate question is the extent to
which the prohibitions contained in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
encompass the Bill of Rights, thus constraining not only the actions of the
federal government, but the actions of state governments (and their political
subdivisions) as well.
With the Fourteenth Amendment as its lodestar, the Court began to
squarely address this issue not long after ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment.1 2 In the Slaughter-House cases, the Court upheld a Louisiana
statute granting an exclusive license to operate a slaughterhouse in New Or-
leans. 113 In observing that the Fourteenth Amendment only barred States
from enacting statutes that abridged the privileges and immunities of the
United States, the Court refused to countenance the argument that the privi-
leges and immunities of United States citizens were substantially the same
as the privileges and immunities of state citizenship. 14  Moreover, the
Court did not construe the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment as encompassing the Bill of Rights, essentially sounding
the death knell for that particular clause as a textualf anchor for incorporat-
ing the Bill of Rights. 115 Indeed, the Court construed the privileges and
immunities protected by the clause in a restrictive fashion, citing the right to
interstate travel, protection on the high seas, and the privilege to file a ha-
108 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
109 60 U.S. (1 How.) 393 (1857).
110 Id. at 403.
ill Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 256 (1982-
1983).
112 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (1 Wall.) 36 (1870).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 78-79.
I1 d. at 70-71. In so doing, the Court also implicitly rejected the "full incorporation"
approach, most prominently championed by Justice Black. The total incorporation approach
originally posited that the Privileges and Immunities of the Fourteenth Amendment were the
Bill of Rights themselves. That the Court rejected the broad construction of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause in the Slaughter-House cases suggested a more deliberative, pains-
taking process by which any right might be incorporated against State action.
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beas corpus petition as examples of the rights afforded by the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
1 16
B. THE "FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS" APPROACH
While essentially foreclosing the prospect of incorporating the Bill of
Rights through the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Court had not ad-
dressed the viability of incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. In Hurtado v. California, the Court rejected a defen-
dant's claim that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause required
a state prosecutorial authority to secure a grand jury indictment before
prosecuting an individual. 117 Despite its holding, the Court placed its im-
primatur on the invocation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause as a potential source for incorporating provisions in the Bill of
Rights, opining that due process encompasses "fundamental principles of
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institu-
tions."1 18 The procedure employed by the State of California in its indict-
ment of Hurtado (information) preserved due process because it assured
"the substantial interest of the prisoner." 119 In contributing to the "funda-
mental fairness" doctrine under the rubric of incorporation, the Court in
Hurtado "established a flexible standard of justice that focused on the es-
sence of fairness rather than the familiarity of form."
' 120
The Court's "fundamental fairness" approach was refined in subse-
quent decisions that became harbingers for the advent of the selective in-
corporation approach, and, ultimately, the Court's modern incorporation
doctrine. In Powell v. Alabama,'21 the Court held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required the appointment of counsel,
116 1d. at 79.
117 110 U.S. 516, 520 (1884). A federal prosecutorial authority is required to secure a
grand jury indictment under the Fifth Amendment. Id.
118 Id. at 535. While observing that States were entitled to devise and implement their
"own modes of judicial proceeding," the Court was careful to observe that "it is not to be
supposed that these legislative powers are absolute and despotic, and that the amendment
prescribing due process of law is too vague and indefinite to operate as a practical restraint."
Id. The Court's later opinions addressing the incorporation of various provisions under the
Bill of Rights demonstrated that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was
indeed a practical restraint on the States.
"' Id. at 538.
120 Israel, supra note 111, at 274. As Israel explains, the underlying premise of the "fim-
damental fairness" approach to incorporation is that "the fourteenth amendment's due proc-
ess clause was designed to make applicable to the states the same concept of due process that
the fifth amendment's due process clause traditionally had made applicable to the federal
government." Id. at 273-74.
121 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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under certain circumstances, 122 in serious criminal cases at the state level.
After reviewing the history of the right to counsel in English law, as well as
its adoption by the states, the Court determined that
the right involved is of such a character that it cannot be denied without violating
those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil
and political institutions is obviously one of those compelling considerations which
must prevail in determining whether it is embraced within the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, although it be specifically dealt with in another part of
the Federal Constitution. 
23
In addressing the incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause under
the Fifth Amendment, the Court embraced a similar approach in Palko v.
Connecticut, where a defendant was convicted of second degree murder, but
nevertheless was tried a second time and convicted of first degree murder,
which carried a death sentence. 124 Following Palko's initial conviction, the
State obtained a favorable ruling finding that its case was unduly prejudiced
by the exclusion of certain evidence. 125 The Court asked whether the retrial
and conviction of Palko on the first degree murder charge constitutes "that
kind of double jeopardy to which the statute has subjected [defendant] a
hardship so acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it?' 126 In
noting that the State was not "attempting to wear the accused out by a mul-
titude of cases with accumulated trials,' 127 but rather seeking only to prose-
cute a single trial "free from the corrosion of substantial legal error,"128 the
Court implicitly recognized that some circumstances 129 would warrant the
application of the Double Jeopardy Clause against the states, but that
Palko's was not one of them. 130 The right asserted by Palko, the Court ob-
served, was not "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.''
122 Id. It is important to note that Powell did not hold that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment required the appointment of counsel in all criminal cases. The lim-
ited principle enunciated by the Court in Powell is emblematic of the "fundamental fairness"
approach, which posits "that only the core element of the guarantee would be a requisite of
due process." Israel, supra note 61, at 277.
123 Powell, 287 U.S. at 67 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
124 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
125 Id.
126 Id. at 328.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 The Court at the time declined to identify the circumstances under which the Double
Jeopardy Clause might be applicable against the States. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment was subsequently incorporated against State action.
130 Palko, 302 U.S. at 328.




The Court shifted its approach in the 1960's, from one of fundamental
fairness to selective incorporation. 132 Fundamental fairness and selective
incorporation shared similar tenets, in that they both endorsed incorporation
of only those rights deemed fundamental under the Court's machinations of
the "ordered liberty" standard, and both encompassed substantive as well as
procedural rights, including those rights that became fundamental subse-
quent to the Constitution's ratification. 133 The subtle, but critical distinction
between the two approaches is the scope of a fundamental right where the
Court determines that protection is afforded by the Bill of Rights.1 34 Pro-
fessor Jerold Israel describes the difference between the two approaches in
the following way:
The fundamental fairness doctrine focuses on that aspect of the guarantee that was de-
nied by a state in a particular case and often assesses the significance of that element
of the guarantee in light of the special circumstances of the individual case. The se-
lective incorporation doctrine, on the other hand, focuses on the total guarantee rather
than on a particular aspect presented in an individual case.
135
Selective incorporation is "wholesale" in character while fundamental
fairness is particularized and incremental.1 36 Selective incorporation also
departs from fundamental fairness in that it "directs a court to test the fun-
damental nature of a right within the context of the common law system of
justice, rather than against some hypothesized 'civilized system' or a for-
eign system growing out of different traditions.
'" 137
It was under this framework of selective incorporation that the Court
decided incorporation cases that came before it in the 1960's, including
Duncan v. Louisiana,138 which established the Court's modem incorpora-
132 Israel, supra note 111, at 290.
133 Id. See supra note 25 for constitutional rights deemed fundamental subsequent to the
Constitution's ratification.
134 Israel, supra note 111, at 291.135 Id. Selective incorporation thus "judges the guarantee as a whole and produces a rul-
ing that encompasses the full scope of the guarantee. Under selective incorporation, when a
guarantee is found to be fundamental, due process 'incorporates' the guarantee and extends
to the states the same standards that apply to the federal government under that guarantee."
Id. Israel opines that the two approaches are also distinguishable on the question of which
party bears the burden of proving the fundamental nature of the right: "Under the fundamen-
tal fairness doctrine, the individual in effect bore the burden of showing that justice could not
be served without the application of the right in question.... Selective incorporation, on the
other hand, placed the burden on the state to show that the long-standing interpretation was
beyond the needs of the guarantee." Id. at 329.
136 Id. at 309.
137 Id. at 292.
138 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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tion doctrine. Duncan, a young, African-American, was charged with sim-
ple battery after allegedly striking a young white man.139 Duncan sought,
but was denied, a trial by jury; Louisiana law only required a trial by jury
where a potential death sentence or imprisonment at hard labor could be
imposed.140 Validating Duncan's claim that the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause demanded a jury trial upon request in criminal cases,
the Court held that because a "trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental
to the American scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which-were they to be
tried in a federal court-would come within the Sixth Amendment's guar-
antee."
141
The Court emphasized the importance of the right in the context of the
"American scheme of justice," and not necessarily its historical precursor or
an idealized system of justice. 142 In underscoring this American scheme of
justice, the Court observed that "every American State, including Louisi-
ana, uses the jury extensively, and imposes very serious punishments only
after a trial at which the defendant has a right to a jury's verdict., 143 While
the Court surmised that fair and equitable criminal processes could be de-
vised that might obviate the need for a jury trial, it nevertheless concluded
that the right to a trial by jury was "necessary to an Anglo-American regime
of ordered liberty.' 44
Just as important as the Court's holding in Duncan was the rationale it
employed in reaching its conclusion. In determining that the right to a jury
trial was fundamental to the American scheme of justice, the Court exam-
ined (1) the history of the jury trial in the United States; (2) the existence of
the right to a trial by jury in the state constitutions of the original States; (3)
popular support for the right to a trial by jury; and (4) the purposes served
by the right to a trial by jury.145 First, the Court noted there was extensive
historical evidence to demonstrate that the right to a jury trial was funda-
mental to the American scheme of justice. 146 Second, the Court found that
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 149.
142 Id. These factors are particularly important in that they personify the selective incor-
poration approach, as contradistinguished from the fundamental fairness approach, which
embraced a more theoretical view of fundamental rights.
14 Id. at 149 n.14.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 151-58.
146 Id. at 151-53. The Court commented that "by the time our Constitution was written,
jury trial in criminal cases had been in existence in England for several centuries and carried
impressive credentials traced by many to [the] Magna Carta." Id. at 151.
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the constitutions adopted by the original States guaranteed jury trials in
criminal cases, and that future states entering the Union thereafter univer-
sally embraced this right "in one form or another.' '147 Third, the Court
opined that there was unequivocal popular support for the right to a jury
trial in criminal cases, noting that the laws of every state guarantee "a right
to jury trial in serious criminal cases; no State has dispensed with it; nor are
there significant movements underway to do so. ' '148 Finally, in examining
the purposes underlying the right to a jury trial in criminal cases, the Court
concluded that "providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of
his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or over-
zealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. "
149
Jury trial provisions in the federal and state constitutions, the Court ob-
served, "reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise of official
power-a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of
the citizen to one judge or to a group of judges."
150
V. INCORPORATION OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
Since the development of the Court's modem incorporation doctrine in
Duncan, the "battle over selective incorporation has been fought primarily
in cases in which a substantial number of Justices believed that a pre-
incorporation precedent interpreting a particular guarantee should not be
applied to the states." ' The Fifth Circuit's recent decision in Emerson, the
influx of recent law journal articles endorsing the individual right approach,
and the Court's reluctance to address the Second Amendment since Miller
have fueled considerable speculation that the Second Amendment, if it con-
fers an individual right, is ripe for incorporation against state action.
The Court's reluctance to address this issue, however, is better under-
stood as a continuing endorsement of its Second Amendment jurisprudence
predating the advent of its modem incorporation doctrine. Indeed, the
Court's silence speaks volumes. In the post-Duncan era, the Court has
twice declined to reconsider its position on the incorporation of the Second
Amendment. 152 Cruikshank and Presser, while preceding the advent of the
Court's modem incorporation doctrine, are not susceptible to their
147 Id. at 153.
148 Id. at 154.
149 Id. at 156.
150 Id.
151 Israel, supra note 111, at 298.
152 Quillici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 863 (1983); Burton v. Sills, 248 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1968), appeal dismissed, 394 U.S. 812
(1969).
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(mis)characterization as relics of a discarded doctrine. 153 For example, the
Fifth Circuit, in Emerson v. United States, observed the following:
As these holdings [Cruikshank and Presser] all came well before the Supreme Court
began the process of incorporating certain provisions of the first eight amendments
into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and as they ultimately rest
on a rationale equally applicable to all those amendments, none of them establishes
any principle governing any of the issues now before us.1
54
Conspicuously absent from the Fifth Circuit's explication of Cruik-
shank and Presser, however, is acknowledgement of the Court's reticence
to reconsider precisely this issue in Burton v. Sillis and Quillici v. Village of
Morton Grove,155 both of which were decided well after Cruikshank and
Presser, and both of which were decided after the incorporation of other
provisions in the Bill of Rights. The Fifth Circuit's unequivocal observa-
tion that Cruikshank and Presser are irrelevant simply finds no support in
the Court's Second Amendment jurisprudence. The Fifth Circuit's ration-
ale is also tantamount to an endorsement of full incorporation; were the
Fifth Circuit's logic applied to other unincorporated rights, decisions pre-
dating the advent of the Court's modem incorporation doctrine would be-
come similarly irrelevant, despite the fact that the Court may have declined
to reconsider its decision and/or incorporate a particular right. Nothing in
Duncan suggests that the Court's incorporation decisions predating the rati-
fication of the Fourteenth Amendment are invalid per se. Conversely, Dun-
can may implicitly reinforce decisions such as Presser and Cruikshank by
establishing the standard that an unincorporated right will remain so unless
it is demonstrated that the particular right in question is fundamental to the
American scheme of justice.
The Court's refusal to reconsider incorporation of the Second
Amendment since the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and, more
importantly, since its decision in Duncan, despite being afforded the oppor-
tunity to do so, suggests the Court's endorsement of the collective right ap-
proach and its concomitant rejection of incorporation. If the Court believed
the Fourteenth Amendment transformed the Second Amendment, in a simi-
lar fashion to other individual rights conferred under the auspices of the Bill
of Rights, it could have seized the opportunity to incorporate the Second
Amendment against the states in either Sillis or Qullici156 While individual
right adherents view the failure to incorporate the Second Amendment as an
abdication of responsibility, the more plausible explanation is that it merely
153 See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 2; Lund, supra note 61.
154 United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 221 n.13 (5th Cir. 2001).
155 See supra note 152.
156 See supra note 152.
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reflects the Court's enduring belief that the Second Amendment does not
confer an individual right to keep and bear arms, and thus would not con-
strain state gun regulations targeting individual possession and ownership.
Even were the Court to examine this issue under the factors enumerated in
Duncan, it would ultimately conclude that the Second Amendment is not
fundamental to the American scheme of justice. 
157
A. HISTORY OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
AND ITS ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING
It is important to note at the outset that there are "only a handful of
sources from the period of constitutional formation that bear directly on the
questions that lie at the heart of our current controversies about the regula-
tion of privately owned firearms."1 58 This complicates the task of discem-
ing the intentions of the Framers of the Second Amendment, despite the fact
that the "Second Amendment, like no other constitutional provision, puts to
the test one's commitment to original intent as a source of constitutional
meaning., 159 Originalism is particularly important in light of the emphasis
that Duncan placed on the history of the right in the United States and its
existence and prominence in state constitutions.
The Constitution's provisioning for military power arose from the
shortcomings in the Articles of Confederation, which empowered the States
at the expense of many national functions, including defense. 160 As the
delegates convened in Philadelphia for the Constitutional Convention, the
lessons of Shays Rebellion underscored the importance of modifying the
apportionment of military power. 161 While militia companies in Massachu-
setts quelled Shays' Rebellion, the military response, to the extent it could
be described as such, was not well-coordinated in light of the threat posed
by the Rebellion. 162 That the framers of the Constitution sought to confer
an individual right to keep and bear arms in the aftermath of Shays Rebel-
lion, which magnified the practical problems of private firearms ownership,
157 Concededly, this is a somewhat awkward enterprise, in that the Court's modem incor-
poration doctrine was developed in the context of determining whether a criminal procedural
protection (the right to a trial by jury in criminal cases) was at issue. The Second Amend-
ment is not a criminal procedural protection. That being said, however, the factors enumer-
ated in Duncan seem applicable in contexts beyond constitutional criminal procedure, and
also provide the only clear test the Court has enunciated for determining whether a particular
right ought to be incorporated against the State.
158 Rakove, supra note 31, at 109.
159 Yassky, supra note 31, at 593.
160 See Finkelman, supra note 31, at 195.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 195-96.
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belies the Second Amendment's insistence that militias be "well-regulated."
As Professor Jack Rakove maintains, the Framers
saw the militia as an institution that would henceforth be regulated through a combi-
nation of national and state legislation firmly anchored in the text of the Constitution,
rather than some preexisting, preconstitutional understanding. Wherever the exact
balance between national and state responsibility would be struck, the militia would
always be subject to legislative regulation. 1
63
1. Legislative History
The singular thrust during the debate over the Constitution at the Con-
stitutional Convention and the Bill of Rights in the House of Representa-
tives 164 was the relationship between state and federal power. The Anti-
Federalists viewed the militia as a buffer to federal power, necessary to se-
cure the primacy of the State as its own political entity. Anti-Federalists
were particularly concerned that if Congress possessed discretionary power
to arm the Militia as it saw fit, the states, and their security, would become
beholden to the whims of the federal government. 165 That the state militias
could potentially be allowed to atrophy was unacceptable to Anti-
Federalists, who continued to fear the potential presence of a federal stand-
ing army. 16 6 Criticizing the Constitution's treatment of the militia, George
Mason, one of the most prominent Anti-Federalists, observed at the Vir-
ginia ratifying convention that
[t]he militia may be here destroyed by that method which has been practised in other
parts of the world before; that is, by rendering them useless-by disarming them. Un-
der various pretenses, Congress may neglect to provide for arming and disciplining
the militia; and the state governments cannot do it, for Congress has an exclusive right
to them .... Should the national government wish to render the militia useless, they
may neglect them, and let them perish, in order to have a pretence of establishing a
standing army.1
67
The federal government's authority for "calling forth the Militia to
execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrection and repel Inva-
sions"'168 in the Constitution also deeply troubled Anti-Federalists, who per-
ceived the clause as enabling Congress, at its discretion, to commandeer the
Militia under the pretext of executing the nation's laws. 69 The Second
Amendment constituted "an injunction to the federal government not to rely
163 Rakove, supra note 31, at 132.
164 The Senate debates over the Second Amendment were held in private.
165 See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 55, at 169-205.
166 See Finkelman, supra note 31, at 205.
167 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 55, at 193.
168 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
169 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 55, at 193.
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solely on its own army, but to continue to keep the militia well armed and
disciplined.'
170
James Madison originally proposed to insert the language that is in the
Second Amendment of the Constitution in Article I, Section 9. The original
language, which became the Second Amendment after modification, said
the following:
The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed and
well regulated militia being the best security of a free country; but no person relig-
iously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service in per-
son. 171
The debate over Madison's proposal in the House of Representatives
focused almost exclusively on the exemption for individuals religiously
scrupulous of bearing arms.172 Anti-Federalists were particularly troubled
by ensconcing any power in the Constitution that would enable the federal
government to define the terms and conditions of military service. 7  Ex-
tending this type of authority in the Bill of Rights would not only empower
the federal government to determine who would receive an exemption from
militia service for religious reasons, but might also constitute a source of
authority for the federal government in future disputes over the control of
the militias. 1
74
That there is not a single statement in the House of Representatives
during the deliberation of the Second Amendment that suggests any legisla-
tive intent to create an individual right to keep and bear arms, distinct from
one's participation in a well-regulated militia, is particularly salient in un-
derstanding the nature of the right that the Framers of the Second Amend-
ment intended to confer. 175 Professor Jack Rakove contends that
the extant records of deliberation (as well as the plain text) of the Constitution
strongly suggest that the only issue its adopters were consciously considering was the
militia, which would henceforth exist as an institution defined by law. No coherent
intention or understanding of the existence and scope of a private, individual right to
keep and bear arms could accordingly be derived, because that question did not pre-
sent itself for public debate in the form in which we now know it.
176
That the issue of private ownership of arms was not even broached
during the debates of the First Congress thus defies the "contention that the
170 Rakove, supra note 31, at 151.
171 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 55, at 169.
172 Id. at 171-72.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 186-90.
175 Id. at 169-91.
176 Rakove, supra note 31, at 111-12.
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militia would henceforth exist as a spontaneous manifestation of the com-
munity at large.' 77 Indeed, the Constitution itself delegates to Congress the
authority for "organizing... the Militia,"' 78 and enacting laws that are
"necessary and proper" to effectuate this purpose. 179 The responsibility for
organizing the militia, entrusted to the federal government under the Consti-
tution, necessarily delegates to the federal government the authority to de-
termine the militia's size and membership. That Congress has exercised
this authority to restrict membership to particular classes of persons evis-
cerates the oft-advanced assertion that the Constitution and/or the Second
Amendment envisioned the militia as an unorganized, amorphous body of
citizens.18
0
Following debate in the House of Representatives, but prior to delib-
eration by the Senate, Madison's original proposal was modified to read:
A well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, being the best security
of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed, but
no one religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military
service in person.
181
Three substantive changes to Madison's proposal were made by the
Senate, which deliberated secretively. 82 First, the language specifying that
the militia was to be "composed of the body of the people," was elimi-
nated.183 Second, the clause reading "being the best security of a free State"
was changed to read "being necessary to the security of a free state.
' 8 4
Third, the clause providing an exemption from bearing arms for religiously
scrupulous individuals was eliminated.
185
The Senate's most significant modification to the language adopted by
the House was its clarification that the militia was not "composed of the
body of the people." Individual right adherents attribute this modification
to the clause's status as "unnecessary surplusage' 86 since the proposal al-
ready clarified that the "right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not
be infringed." This explanation, however, paints an incomplete picture.
177 Id. at 129.
178 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
179 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
180 See 10 U.S.C § 311(a) (1999); 32 U.S.C. § 313(a) (1999).
181 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 55, at 170.
182 Id. at 175-76.
183 Id. at 176.
184 Id. at 175.
185 Id. at 176.
186 United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 250 (5th Cir. 2001). Because the Senate's
deliberations concerning the Second Amendment were conducted in private, possible expla-
nations for the changes it adopted, including those that I advance, are somewhat speculative.
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Article I, Section 8 specifically delegated to Congress the authority to or-
ganize the militia, and, as a corollary, to define its membership. 8 7 By de-
fining the composition of the militia in the Second Amendment (perhaps an
unintended consequence), Madison's initial proposal encroached upon the
legislative prerogative to define the militia, already ensconced in Article I,
Section 8. If the militia was to be legislatively defined, as the Constitution
provided, its membership was inherently malleable; it could be modified at
Congress' discretion. Madison's proposed Second Amendment, however,
defined militia membership in an immutable fashion to include the "body of
the people," a definition that was incompatible with Article I, Section 8.
The deletion of the "body of the people" from the Second Amendment
thus is properly understood as a vindication of the Constitution's ascription
of the militia as a legislatively defined entity, consisting not of the entire
body of the people, but of those individuals who both meet Congression-
ally-defined criteria and engage in military service. None of the modifica-
tions adopted by the Senate suggest its insistence on an understanding of
the Second Amendment as an individual right. That it ultimately eliminated
the exemption for individuals religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, which
consumed much of the debate in the House of Representatives, reflects a
concession to Anti-Federalists who were concerned that the provision
would empower Congress to assert complete control over the militia.
2. Ratification by the States
Many states that ultimately ratified the Constitution sought to address
the right to keep and bear arms in amendments to their ratifying documents.
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania sought specific amend-
ments to the federal Constitution that, if adopted, would have clearly estab-
lished the Second Amendment as an individual right. 188 In some instances,
the proposals, attached as amendments, were initiated at the behest of mi-
nority contingents at the state conventions.' 89 In Massachusetts, for exam-
ple, a vociferous minority of delegates successfully attached language that
proposed amending the Constitution to provide that the Constitution "never
be construed... to prevent the people of the United States, who are peace-
able citizens, from keeping their own arms."'190 New Hampshire sought to
ensure that "Congress shall never disarm any Citizen unless such are or
have been in Actual Rebellion."' 9'
187 See supra note 180.
188 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 55, at 181-82.
189 Id.; Finkelman, supra note 31, at 208.
190 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 55, at 181.
191 Id.
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Perhaps the most expansive interpretation of the Second Amendment
was broached in a manifesto issued by a minority contingent of Pennsyl-
vania Anti-Federalists following the state's ratification of the Constitution.
The document included fourteen proposed amendments to the Constitution,
many of which were "incorporated, almost word-for-word, into the Bill of
Rights.'192 The substance of these proposals, and, in many instances, the
exact language employed by the Pennsylvania Minority itself, ultimately
became what we now recognize as the Free Exercise Clause, the Free Press
Clause, and the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, as well as the
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Amendments.
93
Notably, however, the Framers of the Constitution thoroughly rejected
the expansive right to keep and bear arms proposed by the Pennsylvania
Minority. The Pennsylvania Minority's proposed Second Amendment read,
That the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and their own
state, or the United States, or for the purpose of killing game; and no law shall be
passed for disarming the people or any of them, unless for crimes committed, or real
danger of public injury from individuals.'
94
The variant of the Second Amendment championed by the Pennsyl-
vania Minority is substantively different than the protection ultimately
adopted by the Framers, approved by Congress, and ratified by the states.
That the Framers declined to endorse a broader individual right comparable
to that sought by the Pennsylvania Minority-a position that itself was a
minority among States that submitted amendments with their ratifying
documents-lends credence to the proposition that the Framers sought to
provide for a limited, militia-based prerogative. That sentiment is further
solidified by the Framers' simultaneous endorsement of separate individual
liberties sought by the Pennsylvania Minority, the overwhelming majority
of which are now contained in the Bill of Rights. The absence of the Sec-
ond Amendment language sought by the Pennsylvania Minority in the Bill
of Rights is thus conspicuous:
By seeing what the framers of the Second Amendment did not do, we can better un-
derstand what they did do.... Had the proposals of the Pennsylvania Antifederalists
on this issue been written into the Bill of Rights, the Second Amendment might be the
least controversial of the first ten Amendments. It is of utmost significance, however,
that unlike other aspects of the Pennsylvania proposals, which were incorporated into
the Bill of Rights almost word-for-word, Madison and his colleagues in the First Con-
192 Finkelman, supra note 31, at 206.
193 Id. at 206-07.
194 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 55, at 182.
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gress emphatically rejected the goals and language of the Pennsylvania Antifederalists
on these issues.
195
B. THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN THE ORIGINAL THIRTEEN STATE
CONSTITUTIONS
Unlike Duncan v. Louisiana, where the Court noted that twelve of the
thirteen original States unequivocally protected the right to a jury in a
criminal trial in their constitutions, there is scant evidence that a critical
mass of the original thirteen states embraced an individual right to keep and
bear arms. Indeed, quite the opposite is true. Of the thirteen original colo-
nies, five states-Delaware, Georgia, New Hampshire, New York, and Vir-
ginia-provided for the arming of the militia or provided specific exemp-
tions for bearing arms in a military context.' 96  Three states-
Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania-provided for a "right"
to keep and bear arms in some capacity in their state constitutions. 197 Four
states--Connecticut, Maryland, New Jersey, and Rhode Island--did not
adopt any provision at all relating to the armament of citizens, either in an
individual or military capacity.
98
The commonality among the five states (Delaware, Georgia, New
Hampshire, New York, and Virginia) providing for the arming of the militia
or an exemption from bearing arms is the military context in which the pro-
vision became operative. None of the aforementioned five states that
195 Finkelman, supra note 31, at 208.
196 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 55, at 183-84. The Delaware Declaration
of Rights (1776) read, "That a well regulated militia is the proper, natural and safe defence
of a free government." The Georgia Constitution (1777) read, "Every county in this State
that has, or hereafter may have, two hundred and fifty men, and upwards, liable to bear arms,
shall be formed into a battalion." The New Hampshire Constitution (1783) read, "No person
who is conscientiously scrupulous about the lawfulness of bearing arms, shall be compelled
thereto, provided he will pay an equivalent." The New York Constitution (1777) read, "That
the Militia of the State, at all Times hereafter, as well in Peace as in War, shall be armed and
disciplined, and in Readiness for Service." It also contained a clause for religious objectors.
The Virginia Declaration of Rights (1777) read, "That a well regulated militia, composed of
the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural and safe defence of a free
state."
197 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 55, at 183-84. The Massachusetts'
Constitution (1780) read, "The people have a right to keep and bear arms for the common
defence." It also noted that danger of standing armies to liberty. The Pennsylvania
Constitution (1776) read, "That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of
themselves and the state; and as standing armies in time of peace and dangerous to liberty,
they ought not to be kept up." The North Carolina Declaration of Rights (1776) read, "That
the People have a Right to bear Arms for the Defense of the State; and, as standing Armies
in Time of Peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up; and that the military
should be kept under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil Power."
19 8 Id. at 183-84.
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adopted provisions for arming the militia ever referred to a "right" that the
individuals comprising the militia could assert in the event that firearm
ownership or possession became restricted outside of militia service. The
primacy of the state as an effective buffer to federal hegemony was the
paramount concern among these states; the recognition of an individual
right to keep and bear arms by these states was simply not contemplated in
their constitutions.
Among the three states that provided a "right" to keep and bear arms,
both Massachusetts and North Carolina specifically provided that the right
exists for the common defense of the state. Pennsylvania's Constitution
provided for the right to keep and bear arms in defense of the state and for
self-defense. Pennsylvania was thus the only original state to provide that
(1) there was a right to keep and bear arms and (2) the right existed outside
of a military application. Moreover, to the extent that it can be construed as
emblematic of the interpretation championed by individual right adherents,
Pennsylvania's Constitution conferred only a limited constitutional right for
the purpose of self-defense.
Were the individual right to keep and bear arms fundamental to the
American scheme of justice, one would expect its unambiguous inclusion in
the founding constitutions of the original thirteen colonies. Its conspicuous
exclusion in all but one of the thirteen state constitutions belies the conten-
tion, advanced by supporters of incorporation, that the individual right to
keep and bear arms could have been fundamental to the American scheme
of justice. The Duncan Court, by contrast, concluded that the inclusion of
the right to a jury in criminal trials in all but one of the original thirteen
state constitutions provided substantial support for the characterization of
the right as fundamental to the American scheme of justice. Since the indi-
vidual right to keep and bear arms is present in only one of the original thir-
teen state constitutions-and only in a limited fashion-there is little sup-
port for the proposition that this right ought to be construed as fundamental
to the American scheme of justice, particularly in light of Duncan's lucid
frame of reference.
C. POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS
1. The Right to Keep and Bear Arms in Modern State Constitutions
In assessing whether a particular constitutional guarantee is fundamen-
tal to the American scheme of justice, the Court also examines the popular
support for the right, asking whether states have strengthened, repealed, or
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substantively modified the right.199 The absence of any genuine contro-
versy over the meaning of the constitutional right to an impartial jury in a
criminal trial simplified the Court's inquiry in Duncan. This is not to say
that there was no genuine dispute about the scope and application of the
Sixth Amendment. Indeed, the question of whether a right ought to be in-
corporated against the states is one of scope and application. That there ex-
isted a right to an impartial jury in criminal prosecutions, in some fashion,
however, was not at issue in Duncan. The unambiguous existence of the
right to an impartial jury in criminal trials obviated the need for the court to
identify its precise contours. In so doing, it appropriately confined its in-
quiry to the retention and modification of that right at the state level in de-
termining whether it was fundamental to the American scheme of justice.
The retention and modification of the Second Amendment's guarantee
in state constitutions, however, presents more difficult interpretive prob-
lems. Unlike the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of an impartial jury in
criminal prosecutions, the precise nature of the Second Amendment's guar-
antee remains the subject of intense debate. The mere existence of the right
to keep and bear arms in state constitutions, therefore, is not dispositive of
the substantive guarantee it provides.
The language of the right to keep and bear arms provisions in modem
state constitutions suggests a popular conception of the right that is different
from that envisioned by the Framers of the federal Constitution. While the
framers of many state constitutions envisioned the right to keep and bear
arms as an individual right, it is the restrictions on the exercise of the right
that assume particular salience in resolving the larger question of whether
the right is fundamental to the American scheme of justice. That the right is
susceptible to its construal as an individual right does not necessitate the
conclusion that the right is fundamental to the American scheme of justice.
Indeed, many of the restrictions on the exercise of the right to keep and bear
arms are ensconced in the state constitutions themselves, 200 suggesting the
199 Id. at 154 ("Jury trial continues to receive strong support. The laws of every State
guarantee a right to jury trial in serious criminal cases; no State has dispensed with it; nor are
there significant movements underway to do so. Indeed, the three most recent state constitu-
tional revisions, in Maryland, Michigan, and New York, carefully preserved the right of the
accused to have the judgment of a jury when tried for a serious crime.").
200 See, e.g., FLA. CONST., art. I, §8(a) ("The right of the people to keep and bear arms in
defense of themselves and of the lawful authority of the state shall not be infringed, except
that the manner of bearing arms may be regulated by law."); ILL. CONST., art. I, § 22 ("Sub-
ject only to the police power, the right of the individual citizen to keep and bear arms shall
not be infringed."); LA. CONST., art. I, § 11 ("The right of each citizen to keep and bear arms
shall not be abridged, but this provision shall not prevent the passage of laws to prohibit the
carrying of weapons concealed on the person."); TENN. CONST., art. I, §26 ("That the citizens
of this State have a right to keep and to bear arms for their common defense; but the Legisla-
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existence of a right that is fraught with qualifications and caveats, rather
than a right that is fundamental to the American scheme of justice.
The language of the state constitutional provisions endowing a right to
keep and bear arms can be grouped into four categories: (1) states where
there is no constitutional provision for the right to keep and bear arms;
201
(2) state constitutional provisions that confer a collective right;202 (3) state
constitutional provisions that confer a limited individual right; 20 3 and (4)
state constitutional provisions that confer a broader individual right.20 4
a. States that Provide for No Right to Keep and Bear Arms
California, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, and New York
have opted not to include a provision granting the right to keep and bear
arms in their Constitutions. The absence of the right to keep and bear arms
in the constitutions of these states, while significant, is not dispositive of the
popular support that the right enjoys. 20 5 That the right does not appear in
the constitutions of these states, however, is dispositive of whether the right
is fundamental. The characterization of a right as fundamental, at a mini-
mum, requires its appearance in a state's constitution. It simply strains cre-
dulity to argue that the right to keep and bear arms in the aforementioned
states is fundamental despite the absence of its inclusion in the preeminent
document in which rights are permanently ensconced.
ture shall have power, by law, to regulate the wearing of arms with a view to prevent
crime.").
201 There are six states in this category: California, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jer-
sey, and New York.
202 There are ten states in this category: Arkansas, Hawaii, Kansas, Massachusetts, North
Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.
203 There are eighteen states in this category: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming.
204 There are sixteen states in this category: Colorado, Delaware, Louisiana, Maine, Mis-
sissippi, Missouri, Montana,. Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Da-
kota, Oklahoma, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
205 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 624.714 (2004) (authorizing the carriage of concealed weap-
ons with a permit issued by the State). While Minnesota's concealed firearms statute has
been declared unconstitutional on other grounds, see Unity Church of St. Paul v. State, No.
C9-03-9570, 2004 WL 1630505 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 14, 2004), Minnesota's state legisla-
ture viewed the right of an individual to carry concealed weapons as important.
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b. State Constitutional Provisions that Confer a Collective Right
The states that provide for a collective right to keep and bear arms
generally do so only in the context of service to or defense of the State.2 °6
In many instances, the phraseology of these constitutional provisions
closely resembles or is identical to the language of the Second Amendment.
While there is significant controversy about the nature of the right conferred
by the Second Amendment, most states have carefully distinguished their
constitutional protections from the Second Amendment by explicitly craft-
ing provisions that confer an individual right to keep and bear arms. 20 7 In
conferring a right upon "the people" for the purpose of common defense,
rather than conferring the right upon individual citizens or persons for pur-
poses other than common defense, the states in this category envision a
right that exists only for a particular purpose.
206 See ARIz. CONST., art. II, § 5 ("The citizens of this State shall have the right to keep
and bear arms, for their common defense."); GA. CONST., art. I, § 1, 8 ("The right of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed, but the General Assembly shall have
power to prescribe the manner in which arms may be borne."); HAw. CONST., art. I, § 17 ("A
well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to
keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."); KAN. CONST., BILL OF RIGHTS, § 4 ("The people
have the right to bear arms for their defense and security; but standing armies, in time of
peace, are dangerous to liberty, and shall not be tolerated, and the military shall be in strict
subordination to the civil power."); MASS. CONST., Pt. 1, art. 17 ("The people have a right to
keep and to bear arms for the common defence. And as, in time of peace, armies are danger-
ous to liberty, they ought not to be maintained without the consent of the legislature; and the
military power shall always be held in an exact subordination to the civil authority, and be
governed by it."); N.C. CONST., art. I, § 30 ("A well regulated militia being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed;
and, as standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they shall not be main-
tained, and the military shall be kept under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil
power."); OHIO CONST., art. I, § 4 ("The people have the right to bear arms for their defense
and security; but standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and shall not be
kept up; and the military shall be in strict subordination to the civil power."); S.C. CONST.,
art. I, § 20 ("A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right
of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."); R.I. CONST., art. I, § 22 ("The
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."); TENN. CONST., art. I, § 26
("That the citizens of this State have a right to keep and bear arms for their common defense;
but the Legislature shall have power, by law, to regulate the wearing of arms with a view to
prevent crime."); VA. CONST., art. I, § 13 ("That a well regulated militia, composed of the
body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defense of a free state,
therefore, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; that standing
armies, in time of peace, should be avoided as dangerous to liberty; and that in all cases the
military should be under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.").
207 See infra notes 209, 213-14.
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c. State Constitutional Provisions that Confer a Limited Individual Right
The states that provide for a limited individual right to keep and bear
arms generally (1) confer the right upon a citizen, a person, or persons and
(2) confine this right to self-defense and defense of the State.2 °8 These con-
stitutional provisions are thus distinct from the federal Constitution insofar
as clarifying that the right is generally conferred upon the individual (rather
than "the people") and extends to self-defense as well as defense of the
state. While eighteen states have ensconced a limited individual right to
keep and bear arms in their constitutions, there is little evidence to suggest
that the right, though distinct from that provided in the federal Constitution,
is fundamental. Indeed, confining the scope of the right to self-defense and
defense of the state necessarily excludes other uses for which an individual
may legitimately claim a "right" to possess or use a firearm. That a funda-
mental right could thrive in an environment where its exercise is both se-
verely curtailed and subject to the states' police power is difficult to con-
ceive.
State courts have recognized the limitations placed on the exercise of
this limited individual right, strictly construing the language of the guaran-
tee and recognizing a broad police power to regulate the carriage of fire-
arms. In underscoring the textual limitations concerning the ambit of the
right, the Connecticut Supreme Court observed that the state's constitu-
tional right to keep and bear arms "clearly indicates what purposes are not
208 See ALA. CONST., art. I, § 26 ("That every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense
of himself and the state."); ARIz. CONST., art. II, § 26 ("The right of the individual citizen to
bear arms in defense of himself or the State shall not be impaired .... "); CONN. CONST., art.
I, § 15 ("Every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and the state."); FLA.
CONST., art. I, § 8(a) ("The right of the people to keep and bear arms in defense of them-
selves and of the lawful authority of the state shall not be infiinged, except that the manner
of bearing arms may be regulated by law."); IND. CONST., art. I, § 32 ("The people shall have
a right to bear arms, for the defense of themselves and the State."); MICH. CONST., art. I, § 6
("Every person has a right to keep and bear arms for the defense of himself and the state.");
OR. CONST., art. I, § 27 ("The people shall have the right to bear arms for the defence [sic] of
themselves, and the State, but the Military shall be kept in strict subordination to the civil
power."); PA. CONST., art. I, § 21 ("The right of the citizens to bear arms in defence of them-
selves and the State shall not be questioned."); S.D. CONST., art. 6, § 24 ("The right of the
citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and the state shall not be denied."); TEX.
CONST., art. I, § 23 ("Every citizen shall have the right to keep and bear arms in the lawful
defense of himself or the State; but the Legislature shall have power, by law, to regulate the
wearing of arms, with a view to prevent crime."); VT. CONST., ch.I, § 16 ("That the people
have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the State .. "); WASH. CONST.,
art. I, § 24 ("The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense of himself, or the
state, shall not be impaired, but nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing indi-
viduals or corporations to organize, maintain or employ an armed body of men."); WYO.
CONST., art. I, § 24 ("The right of citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and of the
state shall not be denied.").
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accorded explicit constitutional protection: the bearing of arms for any pur-
pose other than defense of one's self or the state., 20 9 The Alabama Su-
preme Court opined that it is "well-settled and 'universally recognized'...
that this right of a citizen to bear arms in defense of himself and the state is
subject to reasonable regulation under the police powers of the state.
210
Noting that the right to keep and bear arms under its State Constitution is
only a "qualified right,, 211 the Arizona Supreme Court upheld an ordinance
banning the possession of handguns in public parks, concluding that "the
principle that reasonable limitations on the right to bear arms do not offend
the individual constitutional rights is too well-embedded in the jurispru-
dence of Arizona and sister states to be the subject of great debate., 212 It is
thus apparent that the existence of an individual right to keep and bear arms
in State Constitutions does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the
right itself is either fundamental or transformative.
d. State Constitutional Provisions that Confer a Broader Individual Right
States that provide for a broad individual right to keep and bear arms
have generally extended the circumstances under which the right can be ex-
ercised. Some states that have conferred a broader individual right, how-
ever, have only extended the right to keep and bear arms to the defense of
property, as well as self-defense and defense of the state.213 Other states in
this category have extended the right to hunting, recreation, defense of
209 Benjamin v. Bailey, 662 A.2d 1226, 1231 (Conn. 1995).
210 Hyde v. City of Birmingham, 392 So.2d 1226, 1227 (Ala. 1980).
211 City of Tucson v. Rineer, 971 P.2d 207, 212 (Ariz. 1999).
212 Id. at 167.
213 See COLO. CONST., art. II, § 13 ("The right of no person to keep and bear arms in de-
fense of his home, person and property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally
summoned, shall be called in question; but nothing herein contained shall be construed to
justify the practice of carrying concealed weapons."); MISS. CONST., art. 3, § 12 ("The right
of every citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person, or property, or in aid
of the civil power, when thereto legally summoned, shall not be called in question, but the
legislature may regulate or forbid carrying concealed weapons."); Mo. CONST., art. I, § 23
("That the right of every citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person and
property, or when lawfully summoned in aid of the civil power, shall not be questioned; but
this shall not justify the wearing of concealed weapons."); MONT. CONST., art. II, § 12 ("The
right of any person to keep and bear arms in defuse of his own home, person, and property,
or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned, shall not be called in question,
but nothing herein contained shall be held to permit the carrying of concealed weapons.");
N.H. CONST., pt. 1, art. 2-a ("All persons have the right to keep and bear arms in defense of
themselves, their families, their property and the state."); OKLA. CONST., art. II, § 26 ("The
right of a citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person, or property, or in aid
of the civil power, when thereunto legally summoned, shall never be prohibited; but nothing
herein shall prevent the Legislature from regulating the carrying of weapons.").
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property, and other lawful purposes, in addition to self-defense and defense
of the state.2 14 Maine is the only state to seemingly impose no restrictions in
its constitutional provision granting the right to keep and bear arms.
215
Despite the seemingly broader ambit of the right to keep and bear arms
in these states, state appellate courts and Supreme Courts have refused to
endorse the proposition that the right to keep and bear arms enjoys a special
status among individual rights. Quite the opposite is true. A Colorado ap-
pellate court, in upholding the City of Denver's ordinance prohibiting the
carriage of unconcealed firearms on a person and concealed firearms in a
motor vehicle, flatly observed that "the right to bear arms is not a funda-
mental right.,
216
Were the right to keep and bear arms under state constitutions funda-
mental, however, one would expect state Supreme Courts to impose strict
scrutiny on broad firearms regulations that encroach upon the right. Even
states that recognize a broader individual right in their constitutions, how-
ever, have recognized that the right is neither fundamental, nor beyond the
reach of the state's police power. In upholding the City of Portland's con-
214 See DEL. CONST., art. I, § 20 ("A person has the right to keep and bear arms for the
defense of self, family, home, and State, and for hunting and recreational use."); NEB.
CONST., art. I, § 1 ("All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain inherent
and inalienable rights; among these are life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the right to
keep and bear arms for security or defense of self, family, home, and others, and for lawful
common defense, hunting, recreational use, and all other lawful purposes, and such rights
shall not be denied or infringed by the state or any subdivision thereof To secure these
rights, and the protection of property, governments are instituted among people, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed."); NEV. CONST., art. I, § 11 ("Every citi-
zen has the right to keep and bear arms for security and defense, for lawful hunting and rec-
reational use and for other lawful purposes."); N.M. CONST., art. II, § 6 ("No law shall
abridge the right of the citizen to keep and bear arms for security and defense, for lawful
hunting and recreational use and for other lawful purposes, but nothing herein shall be held
to permit the carrying of concealed weapons."); N.D. CONST., art. I, § 1 ("All individuals are
by nature equally free and independent and have certain inalienable rights, among which are
those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting prop-
erty and reputation; pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness; and to keep and bear arms
for the defense of their person, family, property, and the state, and for lawful hunting, recrea-
tional, and other lawful purposes, which shall not be infringed."); UTAH CONST., art. I, § 6
("The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and defense of self,
family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be in-
fringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of
arms."); W. VA. CONST., art. 3, § 22 ("A person has the right to keep and bear arms for the
defense of self, family, home and state, and for lawful hunting and recreational use."); WIs.
CONST., art. I, § 25 ("The people have the right to keep and bear arms for security, defense,
hunting, recreation or any other lawful purpose.").
215 See ME. CONST., art. I, § 16 ("Every citizen has a right to keep and bear arms and this
right shall never be questioned.").
216 Trinen v. City of Denver, 53 P.3d 754, 757 (Colo. App. 2002).
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cealed weapons ordinance, for example, the Supreme Court of Maine sub-
jected the law only to rational basis scrutiny, concluding that the ordinance
was a "reasonable response to the justifiable public safety concern engen-
dered by the carrying of concealed weapons. 217 The Nebraska Supreme
Court opined that its "Right to Bear Arms amendment does not prohibit the
State's reasonable regulation regarding possession of firearms... pursuant
to the State's constitutionally valid exercise of its police power.
218
Conceding the existence of a broader individual right in these states,
the right to keep and bear arms is nevertheless subordinate to the state's po-
lice power. Of particular salience to the incorporation debate2 19 is the type
of firearms statutes that have been upheld in the face of state constitutional
provisions that confer either a limited individual right or a broader individ-
ual right.220 These state regulations are inapposite to the limited time, man-
ner, and place restrictions that have been recognized in the context of First
Amendment jurisprudence, where the challenges were predicated on fun-
damental freedoms incorporated against the states. The state restrictions on
the right to keep and bear arms are indubitably broader, and yet State Su-
preme Courts have consistently upheld their validity against challenges
predicated on constitutional provisions granting the right to keep and bear
arms.221 There is thus scant evidence that the mere existence of an individ-
ual right to keep and bear arms in state constitutions transforms the individ-
ual right into a fundamental right.
2. The Right to Keep and Bear Arms and Public Opinion
Public opinion polls generally reflect Americans' beliefs that the Sec-
ond Amendment confers an individual right to bear arms, subject to some
regulation. A December 2003 poll conducted by Gallup and the National
Constitutional Center found that sixty-eight percent of Americans believe
the intent of the Second Amendment was to provide individuals with the
right to keep and bear arms, while twenty-eight of Americans believe that
the Second Amendment provides a right only for the preservation and exis-
217 Hilly v. City of Portland, 582 A.2d 1213, 1215 (Me. 1990).
218 State v. LaChapelle, 451 N.W.2d 689, 690 (Neb. 1990).
219 It is important to note that the existence of the right to keep and bear arms in modem
State constitutions is but one way to gauge the popular support for the right, which, in turn,
is but one factor in the analysis of determining whether a right is fundamental to the Ameri-
can scheme of justice.
220 See, e.g., Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266 (Ill. 1984) (uphold-
ing a handgun ban against a challenge based on Illinois' constitutional provision protecting
the right to keep and bear arms).
221 See, e.g., supra notes 209-211, 217-18.
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tence of the militias.222 Of the sixty-eight percent of Americans who be-
lieve the Second Amendment provides an individual right, eighty-two per-
cent nevertheless believe the right is subject to some government regula-
223ths anacdvetion. Americans thus have a nuanced view of the Second Amendment,
believing it confers an individual right that is subject to governmental re-
strictions.
How this conception fits into the Court's modem incorporation doc-
trine, which considers popular support for a right, is unclear. The Court re-
cently placed considerable emphasis on what it perceived as an emerging
national consensus against executing the mentally retarded to determine that
such a penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment.224 While it would seem incongruent with the countermajori-
tarian underpinnings of the Constitution to predicate a rule of decision on
an emerging public consensus, the Court's decisions, including the devel-
opment of its modem incorporation doctrine, suggest that such considera-
tions can inform the Court's judgment. In a blistering dissent in the afore-
mentioned death penalty case, Atkins v. Virginia, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
who was joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, disputed the Court's con-
clusion that a national consensus against the execution of the mentally re-
tarded had emerged.225 More importantly, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices Scalia and Thomas unequivocally disavowed constitutional analysis
based (either in whole or in part) on vacillations in public opinion or judi-
cial notice of emerging consensuses. While the issue before the Court in
Atkins is wholly distinguishable from the incorporation of a constitutional
right, it is difficult to envision a scenario where strict constructionists would
consider the popular conception of the Second Amendment in determining
whether it ought to be incorporated against state action.
Reconciling the public's endorsement of the individual right approach
(subject to restrictions) with the Court's recognition of popular support for
the right as a legitimate factor in addressing the incorporation issue is not as
222 Gallup Organization and National Constitutional Center Poll, Dec. 18, 2003 (Con-
ducted Between Sept. 8-10, 2003). The question asked, "Which of the following comes
closer to your interpretation of the Second Amendment to the Constitution-in addition to
addressing the need for citizen-militias, it was intended to give individual Americans the
right to keep and bear arms for their own defense, or it was intended to preserve the exis-
tence of citizen-militias, and does not give individual Americans the right to keep and bear
arms for their own defense?" The poll was based on telephone conversations with 1,025
random adults (eighteen and over) from across the United States. The choices were rotated
to reduce any bias that might result from consistently placing one of the choices first in the
context of the question.
223 Id.
224 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
225 Id. at 321-28 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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simple as it may appear at first glance. If the focus is solely on the public's
conception of the right as individual in nature, the conclusion logically
flowing from such an emphasis is that there is popular support for the
proposition that the Second Amendment confers an individual right. If,
however, the focus is placed on support for restrictions on the right underly-
ing the Second Amendment, the conclusion logically flowing from such an
emphasis is that the restrictions themselves defy the conclusion that the
right is somehow fundamental to the American scheme of justice.
The interminable refrain among those opposed to proposed gun regula-
tions is that there are already thousands of gun restrictions imposed at the
national, state, and local level. Conceding the validity of that figure (for the
sake of argument), it then defies logic to suggest the right is somehow fun-
damental. Indeed, if the right to keep and bear arms was fundamental to the
American scheme of justice, representative legislative bodies, elected by the
very people who would be the beneficiaries of such an individual right,
would not consistently enact statutes designed to restrict or undermine that
right. That a number of these statutes are essentially time, manner, and
place restrictions, peripherally analogous to First Amendment limitations,
only partially responds to the issue. While some individual right adherents
endorse these limited restrictions as constitutional exercises of power, con-
sistent with the right to keep and bear arms as fundamental to the American
scheme of justice, the most heavily populated cities in the United States
have enacted restrictions that are tantamount to handgun bans; these ordi-
nances thus accomplish far more than simply imposing spatial and temporal
restrictions on the possession of firearms.
That Americans (both in large cities and smaller towns) countenance
such restrictions counterpoises the conception of the Second Amendment as
fundamental to the American scheme of justice. It seems unlikely that
Americans would acquiesce to what individual right adherents believe are
unequivocal violations of the individual and fundamental right to keep and
bear arms if such restrictions were constitutionally oppressive. But Ameri-
cans do respect these restrictions, not only because of their public safety
benefits, but because the right to keep and bear arms, as a constitutional
right, has never been considered fundamental to the American scheme of
justice, particularly when juxtaposed with those constitutional freedoms al-
ready incorporated against the States.
D. THE PURPOSE OF THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS
Disparate conclusions about the nature of the right conferred by the
Second Amendment inexorably lead to disparate conclusions about the pur-
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pose(s) it serves. 2 26 Construing the right to keep and bear arms under the
Second Amendment as a right that inures to the individual implies that the
Framers preemptively sought to create a guarantee that would preclude the
government from encroaching upon the right of individual citizens to own
and possess firearms. In fashioning the Second Amendment, however, the
Framers did not seek to prospectively obviate the threat of private firearms
confiscation.227 Both the Framers of the Second Amendment and the Dele-
gates who debated its merits at the State Conventions sought to counter-
poise the Constitution's significant delegation of military power to the fed-
eral government, which included the authority to define the parameters of
militia membership. That the federal government could exercise this au-
thority over the manner in which each State sought to protect its inhabitants
was anathema to the Anti-Federalists, who construed the Second Amend-
ment as an antidote to federal hegemony ensconced in the Constitution. 228
Even if one accepts the dubious proposition that the Framers set out to
create an individual right to keep and bear arms, there remains the question
of whether that right is fundamental to the American scheme of justice,
such that the Second Amendment's import demands incorporation against
State action. And even if one accepts further the notion that the Second
Amendment is functionally analogous to other constitutional guarantees and
is fundamental to the American scheme of justice, there remains the ques-
tion of whether the Second Amendment is conceptually analogous to other
constitutional guarantees incorporated against State action.
Arguments that suggest the Second Amendment's guarantee is concep-
tually analogous to the First Amendment229 mistakenly assume that the
means by which the right is secured in both instances are inextricably inter-
twined with the ends it serves.230  There is little doubt that the First
Amendment not only encourages, but protects the broad circulation and dis-
semination of ideas.231 Indeed, the First Amendment thrives in a flourishing
226 See supra Part IL
227 See supra Part V.A.
228 See supra note 167.
229 See, e.g., William C. Plouffe, Jr., A Federal Court Holds the Second Amendment Is an
Individual Right: Jeffersonian Utopia or Apocalypse Now?, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 56, 117 (ob-
serving that "the First and Second Amendments are inextricably intertwined: to deny one is
to emasculate the other"); Van Alstyne, supra note 61, at 1250 ("To put the matter most
simply, the governing principle here, in the Second Amendment, is not different from the
same principle governing the First Amendment's provisions on freedom of speech and the
freedom of the press.").
230 See Benjamin v. Bailey, 662 A.2d 1226, 1235 (Conn. 1995).
231 See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975) ("The policy of the First
Amendment favors dissemination of information and opinion, and the guarantees of freedom
of speech and press were not designed to prevent the censorship of the press merely, but any
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marketplace of ideas,232 but its robustness would indubitably wither if the
government actively restricted or prohibited the manner in which ideas are
communicated. It is precisely for these reasons that the Court incorporated
the First Amendment's free speech guarantee against state action.233
The guarantee provided by the Second Amendment, however, whether
it is collective or individual, is inapposite to the guarantee provided by the
First Amendment. The Second Amendment does not seek to foster wide-
spread dissemination and circulation of firearms, nor does it seek to create a
marketplace for them. Under either the collective or individual right ap-
proach, the Second Amendment exists to prevent the federal government
from either infringing upon the right of the entire citizenry or a segment of
the citizenry to keep and bear arms. Restricting a means by which the Sec-
ond Amendment can be exercised, unlike the First Amendment, does not
inevitably weaken its guarantee. For example, a ban on the sale, posses-
sion, or use of assault weapons does not prevent the sale, possession, or use
of handguns, which are commonly employed for self-defense. Restricting
or even prohibiting access to certain types of firearms, then, does not in-
fringe upon or eviscerate the right to keep and bear arms.
The-purpose served by the Second Amendment is not necessarily inter-
twined with whether one construes its guarantee as either "individual" or
"collective." The proposition that the Second Amendment is either concep-
tually analogous to the First Amendment, such that both guarantees are
readily susceptible to comparison, or functionally analogous to the First
Amendment, such that both guarantees are fundamental to the American
scheme of justice, requires one to accept the premise that the Second
Amendment speaks with sufficient clarity that it can be juxtaposed with the
First Amendment's more lucid freedom of speech guarantee. There is sim-
ply no evidence that this is the case.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under the factors enumerated in Duncan, the Second Amendment is
clearly not ripe for incorporation, and it is a particularly unlikely candidate
for incorporation in the future. The Fifth Circuit's endorsement (in dicta)
of the individual right approach in Emerson has nevertheless increased the
clamor to incorporate the Second Amendment against the states. In deter-
action of the government by means of which it might prevent such free and general discus-
sion of public matters as seems absolutely essential."); Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (noting that the First Amendment "rests on the assumption that the
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essen-
tial to the welfare of the public").
232 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
233 See generally New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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mining that the Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and
bear arms, the Fifth Circuit implicitly endorsed incorporation when it rea-
soned that the Second Amendment
does not mean that those rights may never be made subject to any limited, narrowly
tailored specific exceptions or restrictions for particular cases that are reasonable and
not inconsistent with the right of Americans generally to individually keep and bear
their private arms as historically understood in this country.
234
In employing language suggesting the imposition of strict scrutiny,
however, the Fifth Circuit's conclusion conflates the two distinguishable
concepts of individual rights and fundamental rights. The existence of an
individual right is not dispositive of its fundamental character. Even if one
construes Emerson as embodying the correct interpretive approach to the
Second Amendment, Duncan requires more than a mere finding that a right
is individual before it can be declared fundamental. The Fifth's Circuit's
approach in Emerson does represent a new paradigm and, indeed, a new
chapter for Second Amendment jurisprudence in the federal courts, albeit
one that is at odds with the text, structure, and underlying history of the
Second Amendment, as well as the doctrine of incorporation.235 That the
right to keep and bear arms is somehow fundamental to the American
scheme of justice is a proposition that likely would have been rejected by
the Framers of the Constitution. In many ways, it has already been rejected
by the very people who would be its ostensible beneficiaries.
234 United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 261 (5th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
235 Fidelity to the individual right approach, however, would require much more aggres-
sive action than the Department of Justice undertook in President Bush's first term. The De-
partment of Justice did not submit a single brief that calls into question the constitutionality
of a federal gun control regulation under the individual right approach during President
Bush's first term. While the Department of Justice's brief in Emerson endorsed the individ-
ual right approach, it did not endorse the invalidation of the underlying federal law that Mr.
Emerson challenged. Challenging the constitutionality of a federal firearms law on the basis
that it violated the individual right to keep and bear arms would drag the Department of Jus-
tice into a battle that it is unwilling to substantively wage, despite its musings to the contrary.
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